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3. After the Lessee Walks Away
The Rights aind Obligations of the Unleased Mineral Owner in a
Producing Unit
Patrick S. Ottinger
OttingerHebert, L.L. C
Lafayette, Louisiana
I. Introduction
1.01 Preface:
Properly speaking, there is no such thing as a "mineral owner" in
Louisiana. Unlie other states, it is not possible to own a separate estate
in minerals.'
"Ownershi' of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and
other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form, or of
any elements or compounds in solution, emulsion, or association
with such minerals. The landowner has the exclusive right to
explore ard develop his property for the production of such
minerals and to reduce them to possession and ownership."'
(Emphasis added).
Thus, Louisiana adheres to the theory of non-ownership of
minerals.' One may, however, own a "mineral servitude" which "is the
right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of
exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession
and ownership."'
Both a landowner (whose land is not fully burdened by a mineral
servitude)' and a mineral servitude owner' may grant a mineral lease.
Thus, both a landowner and a mineral servitude owner is said to own an
Wemple v. NaMrbors Oil and Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923) ("And we
therefore conclude that there is in this state no such estate in lands as a corporeal "mineral
estate," distinct from and independent of the surface estate; that the so-called "mineral
estate" by whatever term described, or however acquired or reserved, is a mere servitude
upon the land in which the minerals lie, giving only the right to extract such minerals and
appropriate them.").
2
Article 6, Louisiana Mineral Code.
Despite the a.-curacy of this observation, practitioners and industry participants
often refer to the "mineral owner" as the person who has the "exclusive right to explore
and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to
possession and ownership."
4
Article 21, Louisiana Mineral Code.
s
"A landowner may . . . lease his right to explore and develop his land for
production of minerls and to reduce them to possession." Article 15, Louisiana Mineral
Code.
6
"A mineral lease may be granted by a person having an executive interest in the
mineral rights on the property leased." Article 116, Louisiana Mineral Code.
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"executive interest," which is defined as "a mineral right that includes an
executive right."' An executive right is "the exclusive right to grant
mineral leases of specified land or mineral rights."' Therefore, for
purposes of this paper, the unleased "mineral owner" which is addressed
in this paper is the person who is vested with the "right to explore and
develop the property for the production of such minerals and to reduce
them to possession and ownership" and, hence, who has the right to grant
a mineral lease. In other words, such person is entitled to enjoy revenue
from the minerals so produced.'
If the lessee makes the determination that the unit will not achieve
"payout," and the lessee chooses to avoid (or minimize) cost obligations,
both for well costs and operating expenses, and to unburden itself of its
royalty obligations, it might elect to release the lease.
Can the lessee even do this? Is this not a classic case of self-serving
or self-interest on the part of the lessee? Where does this leave the
former lessor? While under le:.e, the mineral owner had a right to
receive royalty payments with no obligation for costs. Now, all of a
sudden, it is unleased and potentially has some sort of responsibility for
costs.
This paper addresses the rights and obligations of a mineral owner
after the mineral lease comes to an end, either because' the lease is
released by the lessee or it expires by its terms - "after the lessee walks
away." Principally, this paper considers the described circumstance in
connection with a producing unit created by the Louisiana Office of
Conservation."o However, as there are circumstances under which a
lessee may drill a well on a non-unitized tract of land with the consent of
less than one hundred (100%) per cent of the owners of the executive
interest in the tract," certain of the issues presented herein might be
applicable to the unleased mineral owner in reference to a tract of land
Article 108, Louisiana Mineral Code. Technically (and properly) speaking, a land
owner does not own a "mineral right." Rather, it holds the inherent "right" to "explore
and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to
possession and ownership." Yet, the language of Article 108 implies differently.
Article 105, Louisiana Mineral Code.
Articles 6 and 21, Louisiana Mineral Code, as to a landowner and mineral servitude
owner, respectively.
1o
If the unit were a conventional unit, different consequences would be presented and
such are beyond the scope of this paper. See Ottinger, Conventional Unitization in
Louisiana,49th Ann. Inst. on Min. Law 21 (2002). Also published in the Section Report
for the Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Section of the State Bar of Texas, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 56
(June 2002).
"
See Articles 166 and 175, Louisiana Mineral Code, concerning the necessity to
secure the consent of not less than eighty (80%) per cent of the owners in land or in a coowned mineral servitude, respectively, in order that a lessee might be permitted to
operate.
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/7
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on which is situated a "lease basis" well to the costs of which it has not
consented.12 This paper also considers certain issues relative to a mineral
lessee who does not share in the cost, risk and expense of a well drilled
by an operator.
While this paper focuses on the rights and obligations of the
unleased mineral owner, one must recognize that, for every "right"
identified as being held by one party, there is a corresponding
"obligation" on the part of the other party." Thus, as shown below, if
there is a "right" on the part of an unleased mineral owner to demand a
release of the lerminated mineral lease, there is a correlative "obligation"
on the part of the former lessee to provide it.14
For purposes of this paper, an unleased mineral owner or the
mineral lessee who does not share in the cost, risk and expense of a well
is sometimes referred to as a "non-participating owner." In some
instances, as the context may require, reference will be made to an
"unleased mineral owner" in order to distinguish such a person from a
non-participating mineral lessee.
1.02 Legal Ch aracterization of Oil and Gas:
In order to consider certain issues pertinent to the rights and
obligations of a non-participating owner, it is necessary to have a basic
understanding of the legal nature of oil and gas as it is produced and
captured. This is so because the rights and obligations of the parties are
in large part de-termined by a proper characterization of oil and gas, as
produced and oaptured, within the structure of the civil law system of
property.
A. Oil and Gas Insusceptible of Ownership Until Reduced to
Possession.
Given the proposition that land and any minerals inherent in the
land are immovable," and the equally obvious fact that oil, for example,
is a liquid which can be captured in a vessel and thereby handled and
transported, the question arises: At what point does the character of
mobility arise?
When one thinks of oil, for example, one might think of refined oil
as it exists in a can which might be purchased off of the shelf. Clearly,
that is not immovable property. When did its character change?

See Articles 164, 166 and 175, Louisiana Mineral Code.
'3
"An obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person, called the obligor, is bound
to render a performance in favor of another, called the obligee. Performance may consist
of giving, doing, oi not doing something." Article 1756, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
14
See Section (.03 hereof, infra.
is Article 462, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
12

-
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This is the issue presented in several articles of the Mineral Code
where reference is made to the "reducing to possession" of oil and gas
which might be produced."
Article 7 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides the answer:
"Minerals are reduced to possession when they are under physical
control that permits delivery to another."
In case of oil and gas, this occurs at the wellhead." It is at the
wellhead that minerals are captured or "reduced to possession." At that
functional point in time - when the oil and gas is brought to the surface
of the earth and is susceptible of being captured or gathered and
otherwise handled by the operator - the product itself ceases to be a
component part of the immovable which is the earth, and becomes
"movable" property."
The import or consequence of this fact of mobility might be
illustrated in a variety of non-mineral rights contexts.
For example, Wiltz v. Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing,N.A.,
Inc.,8 concerned Article 2315.3 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code."
Certain oilfield workers were injured when a "flash fire" which
occurred at a well site operated by the defendant. The operator brought a
motion for summary judgment challenging the applicability of the cited
article since the "accident was caused by emissions from the well, of
naturally occurring gas from an underground formation, which had never
2
been reduced to possession." o
The court said that, "[i]mplicit in storing, handling or transporting is
the requirement that the hazardous substance be in the possession or
control of a person who then handles or otherwise deals with that
substance." Citing Article 7 of the Mineral Code, the Court said:
It is clear that [Mobil] did not exercise control over the gas in this
case. The accident was caused by emissions from the well, of
naturally occurring gas from an underground formation, which had
never been reduced to possession by [Mobil] or any other person or
entity. Louisiana law provides that a person does not acquire
ownership or other dominion over fugacious minerals until they are
reduced to possession. . . . The gas in this case had never been
See Articles 5, 6, 8 and 15, Louisiana Mineral Code.
In the area of security agreements granting a security interest in movable
property,
this is called the "minehead." See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(6)(B) (definition of "as-extracted
collateral.").
18
702 F.Supp. 607, 608 (W.D. La. 1989).
19
Prior to its repeal by Act No. 2 of 1996, Ist Ex. Session, this article authorized
exemplary or punitive damages for injuries arising from the "storage, handling or
transporting of hazardous substances."
20
Id. at 608.
16

17
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reduced to possession by [Mobil] or anyone else; therefore, [Mobil]
could no t be said to have been storing, handling or transporting the
gas.
Yet another non-mineral context in which this issue might arise
involves the question of whether a judicial mortgage burdening a tract of
land on which there is a producing well, affects production captured at
the wellhead, when, as and if produced. The workings of a variety of
articles would indicate that the recordation of the judicial mortgage does
not give the judgment creditor any rights with respect to minerals which
are produced from the encumbered property." This conclusion is
supported by analogies drawn from jurisprudence dealing with
agricultural crops. 2
Another consequence which attaches to the fact that a suit by an
unleased mineral owner seeking to recover proceeds of production as
possessed by at unit operator is that such a suit is a proceeding to recover
a movable, arid is not a suit which "asserts" an interest in immovable
property. Hence, under the rules of venue contained in the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, such a suit should be brought at the domicile of
the defendani-operator," rather than where the 2?roperty is located
(unless that ii also the domicile of the operator). Unfortunately, the
courts have been less than consistent in recognizing the true object of
such a suit for purposes of applying rules of venue.25
B. Productsv. Fruits.
If a well is drilled in a unit which includes a tract of land (or interest
therein) which is unleased, the unleased mineral owner has certain
remedies. The nature of these remedies is established by a characterization of oil and gas in the general property framework of the Louisiana
Revised Civil Code.
Because the production of minerals results in the depletion of the
property (min.rals are not a replenishable commodity, such as apple
See Article. 3285, 3286, 3299 and 3302, Louisiana Revised Civil Code; Article
2292A, Louisian. Code of Civil Procedure, and Articles 6 and 16, Louisiana Mineral
Code.
22
See Wakefield State Bank v. Baker Wakefield Cypress Company, 4 La.App. 676
(1926) ("When pr perty seized has been detached from the soil, it has lost its condition of
immobility and has become movable and therefore was not affected by a mortgage and
privilege placed o 3 the immovable."). Cf Vosburg v. FederalLand Bank ofNew Orleans,
21

172 So. 567 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1937) (". . . mere seizure of mortgaged realty did not

divest the lessee thereof of title to the crop being raised thereon by him.").
23
Article 42, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
24
Article 80, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
23
Ironwood Rcsources, Ltd. v. Baby Oil, Inc., 05-467 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 2/1/06); 921
So.2d 1189.

-

Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008

63 -

5

Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 7

trees or sugar cane), minerals are, in legal contemplation, products, not
fruits.26
In the context of a suit for an accounting between co-owners of land
on which a well was drilled and produced, the court in Elder v. Ellerbe"
said the following relative to the legal nature of oil and gas, to-wit:
In other words, the defendant contends that minerals are to be
included in the definition offruits.
The sense in which the word 'fruits' is used is this article of the
Code,28 i. e. "the right which such a possessor has to gather for his
benefit the fruits," does not suggest the meaning of minerals. It
refers to what is produced and reproduced from time to time or in
successive seasons.
"The fruits must be of things that are born and reborn of the soil."
Dalloz, Baudry-Lacontinerie, No. 321.
This notion is continued in Article 488, Louisiana Revised Civil
Code, which provides, as follows:
Products derived from .a thing as a result of diminution of its
substance belong to the owner of that thing. When they are
reclaimed by the owner, a possessor in good faith has the right to
reimbursement of his expenses. A possessor in bad faith does not
have this right.
Because minerals are products, and not fruits, Article 488 of the
Civil Code instructs that they may be reclaimed by the owner, but the
producer, if in good faith, is entitled to be reimbursed the cost of
production.
Professor Yiannopoulos says it this way:29
According to Article 488 of the Civil Code and prior jurisprudence,
possessors in good faith engaging in mineral . . . operations are

bound to account to the owner of the land, but they are entitled to
reimbursement of their production costs. Recovery of expenses in
these circumstances conforms with the principle of unjust
enrichment. Possessors in bad faith engaging in similar operations
are not entitled to reimbursement of production costs.

Comment (c) to Article 551, Louisiana Revised Civil Code, instructs that
"[m]ineral substances extracted from the ground and the proceeds of mineral rights are
not fruits, because their production results in depletion of the property."
27
135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
28
The court had reference to former Article 3453, Louisiana Revised Civil Code, now
contained in Article 486, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
29
Yiannopoulos, 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Property § 274 (4th Ed. 2001).
26

-

64

-

https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/7

6

Ottinger: After the Lessee Walks Away: The Rights and Obligations of the Un

In a case i:-ivolving the unauthorized mining of salt,o the court held
that, if the trespasser acted in bad faith, the amount of the damages is the
value of the mineral at the well without deducting the cost of production.
In deciding this case,- the court relied on a long line of cases involving
the cutting and removing of timber, which in turn were based on a case
decided by the United States Supreme Court in accord with common law
decisions.
An operator was held to not be entitled to reimbursement of costs of
drilling where it was found to not be in good faith since it went onto the
property in question with a "written title opinion from his attorneys ...
to the effect that the title of his lessors was 'at best, questionable."'
In a more recent case,32 an operator which produced a well under a
mineral lease which was ultimately held to have expired, was found to be
in bad faith after the filing of a successful suit to establish lease
expiration, notwithstanding that the court found it "in good faith with
regard to the Durham Lease prior to judicial demand." Consequently, on
authority of Article 488, the operator was "not entitled to recover costs of
production . . . after that date" of judicial demand.
There are a number of cases under the style of Lamson Petroleum
Corporation v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc. which concern the issue of
whether an operator is entitled to recoup its costs after a suit is filed to
challenge the right of the operator to possess certain rights to minerals
underlying tracis of land." This series of cases - arising out of the Scott
Field of Lafayete Parish - resulted in conflicting rulings of the Court of
Appeal, Third Circuit.
By order of the Louisiana Supreme Court, these cases were
remanded to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, which was "ordered to
hold an en banc hearing" in order to determine which of two conflicting
decisions were correct.3 4
In compliance, the Court of Appeal held an en banc hearing and
ruled, as follows:
State v. Jeffe-son Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935), cert.
denied 297 U.S. 716, 56 S.Ct. 591, 80 L.Ed. 1001 (1936).
31
Texas Company v. O'Meara,228 La. 474, 82 So.2d 769 (1955).
32
Edmundson Brothers Partnershipv. Montex Drilling Company, 98-1564 (La.App.
3rd Cir. 5/5/99); 731 So.2d 1049.
n
"For purposes of accession, a possessor is in good faith when he possesses by
virtue of an act translative of ownership and does not know of any defects in his
ownership. He ceas.s to be in good faith when these defects are made known to him or an
action is instituted against him by the owner for the recovery of the thing." Article 487,
Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
34
2002-1338, 2002-1681, 2002-2419 (La. 10/25/02); 832 So.2d 975.
3s
2001-1201, 2002-138 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 12/31/02); 832 So.2d 975; writ denied
2003-0333 (La. 4/21/03); 841 So.2d 796-7.
30

-
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In Lamson Petroleum Corporationv. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., et
al., 2002-138 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/10/02); 823 So.2d 431, we noted the
plain language of article 487 mandates that a possessor "ceases to be
in good faith" when an action is instituted against it, and stated as
follows:
There is no exception or qualification to this rule set out in ...
article [487]. In Edmundson [Bros. Partnership v. Montex
Drilling Co., 98-1564; 731 So.2d 1049], we held a mineral
lessee ceases to be in good faith under La. Civ.Code arts. 487
and 488 at the time of judicial demand and ceases to be entitled
to recover the costs of production. We specifically noted,
although the defendants-appellants were in good faith prior to
judicial demand, they ceased to be in good faith after the filing
of the petitory action. La.Civ.Code art. 488 provides that a
possessor in bad faith does not have the right to reimbursement
of expenses. Accordingly, defendants-appellants are not
entitled to recover expenses they incurred after the filing of this
suit. That portion of the judgment finding defendantsappellants in good faith after the filing of suit is reversed, and
they are not entitled to expenses after that date.
Lamson, 823 So.2d at 437.
Accordingly, that portion of the decision rendered in Lamson
Petroleum Corporationv. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., et al., 20011201 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/20/02); 814 So.2d 596 finding to the
contrary is hereby reversed and we hereby hold on remand that
defendants ceased to be in good faith when suit was filed.
The decision in these cases was troubling, to say the least. No well
was ever drilled on the lands at issue - in fact, the lands at issue
constituted road beds and the principal issue was whether they were
owned in full or perfect ownership or as a mere servitude. The road beds
were included within a producing unit created by the Commissioner of
Conservation.
The Conservation Act clearly provides that a participant in a
compulsory unit is responsible for its allocated share of costs incurred to
drill, test, complete, equip and operate the unit well." What is often at
issue is the nature of that obligation - is the non-drilling party obligated
to pay "out of pocket" or must the operator recover its share out of
production?"
The failure of the court to recognize that the operator was producing
pursuant to the authority of the Commissioner of Conservation and to
36

La. R.S. 30:10A(2).

n

See Section 3.03 hereof, infra.
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apply the express provisions of the Conservation Act has resulted in an
erroneous and inequitable rule.
If the court perceived a conflict between the provisions of the
Louisiana Revised Civil Code," on the one hand, and the provisions of
the Conservaticn Act," on the other hand, it should have applied the well
established principle of statutory interpretation which holds that the
specific statute controls over a statute of general application.40
To hold that a unit operator which conducts unit drilling operations
on another tract is, after the filing of a suit, to be deemed to be in bad
faith with the consequence of forfeiting its right to recoup the allocated
share of unit drilling costs out of production from or attributable to an
unleased tract is to ignore the explicit mandate of the Conservation Act.
If there is any conflict between the generalized provisions of the
Louisiana Revised Civil Code and the specific provisions of the
Conservation Act, the latter should apply.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that "traditional
concepts of property law must yield in the event of operation conducted
in connection with a unit created by the Commissioner of Conservation."
Thus, in Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Company,4 1 it was held that "the
more recent legislative enactments of Title 30 and Title 31 supercede in
part La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 490's general concept of ownership of the
subsurface by tie surface owner of land. Thus, when the Commissioner
of Conservatior has declared that landowners share a common interest in
a reservoir of natural resources beneath their adjacent tracts, such
common interest does not permit one participant to rely on a concept of
individual ownership to thwart the common right to the resource as well
as the important state interest in developing its resources fully and
efficiently."
The ruling in Lamson Petroleum Corporation v. Hallwood

Petroleum, Inc. is clearly repugnant to the well recognized notion that
one may not enjoy the benefits of an asset (the produced oil and gas)
without sharing in the risk of production (allocated share of well costs).
As this is not a case where a person physically entered another tract in
Articles 487 End 488, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.

3
39

La. R.S. 30:10)A(2).

"Where two ;tatutes are in conflict, the statute that is more specifically directed to
the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the statute that is more general in

4

character." Teacher's Retirement System of Louisiana v. Vial, 317 So.2d 179, 183 (La.

1975). "In the interpretation of statutes and contracts, the specific controls the general."
Corbello v. Iowa Production, 2002-0826 (La. 2/25/03); 850 So.2d 686, 704, rehearing
granted in part, opinion clarified, and otherwise rehearingdenied, (La. 6/20/03); 850
So.2d 714;judgmert renderedon remand,2001-567 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 8/6/03); 851 So.2d

1253.
41

488 So.2d 95.i, 964 (La. 1986).

-
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bad faith in order to produce minerals to which it had no lawful claim,
your author would suggest that this case turns the notion of unjust
enrichment on its head.
C Election ofRemedies.
Another consequence of the distinction between fruits and products
is the remedy to which the mineral owner is entitled in the case of
production by another of minerals to which the owner is entitled.
Although no longer "good law" to the extent that it embraced the
"election of remedies" theory suppressed by the adoption of the current
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,42 the case of Liles v. Producers' Oil
Co.43 illustrates this point. There, co-owners owning an undivided onefifth (1/5) interest in a tract of land sued their remaining co-owners and
the mineral lessees of those remaining co-owners, seeking "the value of
one-fifth of the oil and gas taken from said land by the said oil
companies." The oil and gas production ensued from a mineral lease
signed by the defendant co-owners, which mineral lease purported to
lease the entire interest in the co-owned lands.
The defendants interposed on objection of prescription of one (1)
year, arguing that the plaintiffs' suit was for damages arising out of the
wrongful act of defendants in going onto plaintiffs' land and extracting
minerals.
The court noted that the prescription applicable to a claim is
determined by the character of the claim asserted by the plaintiff, and
that "a plaintiff and no one else must choose his remedy and determine
the form and character of his action. ,'4
It was held that the landowner who seeks restitution for the
unauthorized production of minerals from his land, must elect whether he
is better off by -

a. repudiating the lease which he did not sign, and recovering the
value of the produced minerals, subject to reimbursement of
production costs, or
b. adopting and affirming the lease, and recovering the royalty
provided for in the lease.
The plaintiff gets "one bite at the apple" - Whatever election is
made, the plaintiff cannot thereafter pursue the other, unelected theory of
recovery:
"A reading of Liles indicates that the decision was based upon the 'theory of the
case' doctrine. This harsh and unduly technical doctrine was suppressed by the enactment
of LSA-C.C.P. Article 862." Northcott Exploration Company, Inc. v. W. R. Grace and
Company, Inc., 430 So.2d 1077 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1983).
43
155 La. 385, 99 So. 339 (1924).

42

4

Id. at 341.
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A person whose property has been wrongfully taken and
appropriated by another, and who has the right either to sue for
trespass or to sue for the property or the value of the property
received, cannot maintain both actions, either at the same time or
one after the other.45
The plaintiff's election was purely economic. If the value of
production, after bearing a cost of production, is low, the plaintiff would
want to adopt and affirm the lease, and recover the royalty provided for
in the lease, free and clear of costs of production. In such case, the
plaintiff s claim i. one for the recovery of "rent," and is subject to liberative prescription (if three (3) years.46
Conversely, if the value of production, after bearing a cost of
production, is highb (or at least higher than a mere fractional royalty share
unburdened by costs), the plaintiff would want to repudiate the lease
which he did not sign, and recover the value of the produced minerals,
subject to reimbursement of production costs.
In such case, the plaintiffs claim sounds in tort, and is subject to
liberative prescription of one (1) year.4 7
The dilernma was that the plaintiff, prior to filing suit and obtaining
discovery, would not have ready access to the information necessary to
assist it to determine which course to pursue.
11.03 Nature of the Relationship Between the Non-Participating
Owner and the Unit Operator
To appreciate certain of the issues considered herein, it is helpful to
have an understaiding of the nature of the relationship between the
various participants in a compulsory unit, particularly an unleased
mineral owner vis--A-vis the unit operator.
It is axiomatic that the owner of an executive interest in minerals
(either a landowner or the owner of a mineral servitude) has no
obligation to grant a mineral lease.4 8 Moreover, the courts obviously have
no power or right to impose or create a contractual relationship.49 The
court in Willis v. International Oil and Gas Corporations rejected a
landowner's argument that "the doctrine of correlative rights" authorized

45

Liles v. Texas Co., 166 La. 294, 116 So. 229 (1928).

46

Article 3494(5), .ouisiana Revised Civil Code.

Article 3492, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
48
"The owner of an executive interest is not obligated to grant a mineral lease,...
Article 109, Louisiana Mineral Code.
49
"It is not within the province of the court . . . to make new contracts for the
parties." Texas Co. v. State Mineral Board, 216 La. 742, 44 So.2d 841, 845 (1949).
5o
541 So.2d 332 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1989).
47
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the court "to create a contract between the unleased land owner and the
operator.""

John McCollam's excellent paper on this.topic is still a "must-read"
in this regard. 52 However, as a few things have changed in a mere four
decades, a few additional observations might be helpful.
The unleased mineral owner could be an "owner" within the
meaning of the Conservation Act as it is a "person, including operators
and producers acting on behalf of the person, who has or had the right to
drill into and to produce from a pool and to appropriate the production
either for himself or for others."" However, if the mineral owner grants a
mineral lease (say, to one other than the operator), that lessee is
contractually granted the "right to drill" and, hence, becomes an "owner"
for purposes of the Conservation Act.54
To constitute an "owner" within the contemplation of the
Conservation Act, one must own an operating interest and not a mere
reversionary interest in a mineral servitude."
Prior to 1993, an "owner," for purposes of the Conservation Act,
was defined as a "person who has the right to drill into and to produce
from a pool and to appropriate the production either for himself or for
others." The definition of "owner" was amended in 1993" so that it now
reads as noted above. By shifting from the present tense ("has the right to
drill") to both the present and past tense ("has or had the right to drill"),
the term "owner" allows the Commissioner to pursue a former operator
in order to enforce the requirements of the Commissioner relative to,
among other things, remediation obligations under applicable
regulations."
"Inasmuch as Marshall did not lease from the Willises, it has no contractual
relationship with them, nor is it under a duty to now enter into a lease with them." Id. at
336.
52
McCollam, Legal Relations Among Parties to Compulsory Units, 15th Ann. Inst.
on Min. Law 69 (1968). See also Pearce, The Legal Relationships Among Parties to a
Unit, 34th Ann. Inst. on Min. Law 107 (1987).
3
La. R.S. 30:3(8).
54
Cf Wall v. Leger, 402 So.2d 704 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1981) ("A mineral lessor does
not transfer ownership of mineral rights when he enters into a lease; he grants to the
mineral lessee the right to explore for and produce minerals; it is 'operating rights and the
right to share in production' that are transferred to the lessee, not ownership of the
mineral rights.").
ss
Smith v. Holt, 223 La. 821, 67 So.2d 93, 96 (1953).
56
Act No. 113 of the 1993 Louisiana Legislature.
s7
Louisiana Office of Conservation policy mandates that existing operators of record
shall be responsible for oilfield site remediation. However, if the current operator of
record cannot be located or is incapable of performing, the Commissioner can enforce
responsibility against prior operators. See Enforcement Policy - Abandoned Wells &
Pits, Memorandum by J. Patrick Batchelor, Commissioner of Conservation, dated July
51
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The purposc of the.-amendment was explained by the Louisiana
Supreme Court ir. Yuma Petroleum Company v. Thompson," as follows:
The 1993 amendment to, La.,R.S. 30:3(8) merely gives the Commissioner the discretion to proceed under La. R.S. 30:4(C)(16)(a)
against prior owners in certain circumstances. At oral argument, the
Commissioner explained that the amendment was a "Commissioner's bill," drafted to give the Commissioner more
discretionary authority to proceed against prior owners, not to
encumber the Commissioner with the additional duty of having to
ascertain ev' y prior lease holder of a site and to determine which
lease holder actually caused the subject contamination. It is well
established in the State's oil and gas community that the current
"operator of record" of a lease is responsible for remediation on that
lease.
As concerns the operator of a compulsory unit, the courts have
characterized the operator in a variety of ways, including an "agent pro
hoc vice," 9 a "representative of the common interest,'" a "managing
owner"" and a negotiorum gestor or "manager." 62
Whatever the' proper characterization of the role of the unit operator
and his relationsh:p to the non-participating owner, it is sufficient to note
that the unit operator, with or without the concurrence of the nonparticipating owncr, has the exclusive right to drill the unit well6 and to
sell or otherwise dispose of unit production."
II. Extinguishment of the Mineral Lease
2.01 Release as a Mode of Extinguishment:
A. Preface.

24, 1990, also discussed in footnote 201, infra.
51 98-1399, 98-1410 (La. 3/2/99); 731 So.2d 190.
59
Dixon v. American Liberty Oil Co., 226 La. 911, 77 So.2d 533 (1954).
60
Mire v. Hawkins, 249 La. 278, 186 So.2d 591 (1966).
Amoco Productign Company v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 376, 392 (La.App. 1st Cir.
1987), writ denied 520 So.2d 118 (La. 1988), appeal after remand, 566 So.2d 138
(La.App. 1st Cir.), wrii denied 571 So.2d 627 (La. 1990).
62
Taylor v. DavidNew Operating Company, Inc., 619 So.2d 1251
(La.App. 3rd Cir.),
writ denied 625 So.2d 1046 (La. 1993).
63
EnerQuest Oil aid Gas, LLC v. HonorablePhilip N. Asprodites, Commissioner of
Conservation, 2002-0822 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/2/03); 843 So.2d 535 ("[T]he commissioner
has the power to establish compulsory units and designate unit operators therefor." Id. at
5:39, citing Hunt Oil Company v. Batchelor,cited at footnote 210, infra.).
64
Amoco Production Company v. Thompson, cited at footnote 61, supra, at
p. 392
[observing that the Commissioner "has the power (in some circumstances) to designate a
managing co-owner fo:- purposes of marketing the minerals which have been reduced to
possession.")].
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To state the obvious, a "mineral lease is a contract by which the
lessee is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals."'
"Obligations arise from contracts and other declarations of will.'" "An
obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person, called the obligor, is
bound to render a performance in favor of another, called the obligee."'
One of the modes of extinguishment of an obligation is
"remission."6 This may be express or tacit.69
The lessee has the right to release the lease, without the concurrence
of the lessor. In Coastal Club v. Shell Oil Co.,70 a lessor sought
cancellation of a mineral lease and the lessee executed a release covering
all land under lease except 40 acres around each of two producing wells.
The lessor contested the validity of the release on the theory that it was
necessary that the lessor accept the release in order to be effective. The
court rejected this contention, saying, as follows:
Basically, the principle as now contained in the opinion of the
Circuit Court, is against public policy. A release should be a release;
no acceptance is necessary; that is all. In our oil and mineral
contracts, such must have been the practice. Consult the text-books
and verify the dearth of litigation on the point; merely because the
question is never even debated. Summers, Oil and Gas, Perm.Ed.,
vol. 3, ch. 17, Termination of Lease by Surrender, Secs. 521-526.
We find no case in Louisiana; La.Dig., vol. 13, Mines and Minerals.
To require a lessor to accept the surrender of an oil and gas lease
would place lessees or oil operators in a very precarious position. In
the instance where a lessee is the obligee under a term lease, let us
say for a primary term of ten years, and he no longer wishes to pay
the annual rental and he should, before the rental due date, place of
record a surrender of the lease, this surrender could not become
effective under this theory without an acceptance.
The right to release a mineral lease as to a portion or portions of the
leased premises, and thereby be relieved of obligations not yet arisen, is
Article 114, Louisiana Mineral Code.
66
Article 1757, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
67
Article 1756, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
68
Revision Comment (d) to Article 1756, Louisiana Revised Civil Code, states that
the "expression 'remission of debt' has been preserved after carefully weighing the
advisability of adopting the term 'release,' which perhaps better conveys the intended
meaning." The redactors elected to continue to use the term "remission," deeming it
"preferable to avoid even the slightest possibility of confusion due to terminology."
69
Article 1888, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
70
56 F.Supp. 641 (W.D. La. 1944), rev'd on other grounds 147 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1944).
65
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explicitly set fbrth in the prevalent forms of the commercially printed
mineral lease. This provision is called a "surrender clause."
For example, one form in popular use in South Louisiana" provides,
as follows:
Lessee may, at any time prior to or after discovery and production
of minerals on the land, execute and deliver to Lessor or place of
record a release or releases of any portion or portions of the lands
and be relie.ved of all requirements hereof as to the land surrendered,
and, if during the primary term, the rental shall not be reduced.
Another form in use in North Louisiana' reads, as follows:
Lessee, or any assignee hereunder, may at any time execute and
deliver to lessor, . . ., or place of record, a release or releases

covering any portion or portions of the premises held by him, and
thereby surrender this lease as to such portion or portions, and
thereafter the rentals payable by him shall be reduced
proportionately.
No case his considered the issue of whether a lessee is denied the
right to release a lease which is in production, to the extent that such
action might be contended to be a violation of the lessee's obligation to
perform the lease contract in good faith." Clearly, a lessee who releases
a lease which is in production is doing so out of its own self-interest, and
not in the interest of the lessor, who, upon the release, is no longer
entitled to royalties and is obligated, to some extent, for well costs (out
of production)." The relationship between a lessor and a lessee is viewed
by the courts as one "in the nature of a cooperative venture in which the
lessor contributes the land and the lessee the capital and expertise
necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both
parties."" It is hard to conceive that a lessee who releases a producing
lease is doing so "for the mutual benefit of both parties.""
1 3, Bath 4A lease form. 3 of the Bath 6 lease form is substantially the same as
the quoted language, except it makes reference to the right of the lessee to release as to
the "land, stratum or strata."
72
l 4 of the 143R1-2A lease form. This precise clause was contained in the lease
involved in Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Company, 213 La. 1051, 36 So.2d 34 (1948).
7
"A mineral le:;see is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound
to perform the contract in good faith . . . ." Article 122, Louisiana Mineral Code. This is
not a concept unique to mineral leases. Article 1759, Louisiana Revised Civil Code,
establishes that "[g]Dod faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee in
whatever pertains to the obligation," while Article 1983, Louisiana Revised Civil Code,
instructs that "[c]ontracts must be performed in good faith."
74
See Section 3.02 hereof, infra.
7
Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So.2d 1334, 1338 (La. 1982).
76
As an illustration, see discussion of Shanks v. Exxon Corporation in Section 3.02
7

hereof, infra.
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B. Right ofLessee to Rescind Release Made in Error.
If a release of a producing mineral lease is executed in error, a
lessee might have relief to rescind the erroneous instrument and restore
its leasehold position.
In Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Chappuis," the lessee sued
to rescind a release of a lease which was executed in error. The lessor
had requested a release and the company prepared it, but erroneously
included eight leases "which were still producing." After this error was
discovered, suit was brought to rescind the release on the basis of error.
The court found that the release "was executed through error of fact
which vitiates the consent of Humble and renders the instrument
unenforceable." Said the court:
There can be no question that Humble did not intend to release
those portions of the Chappuis tract which remained in the two
producing units. It is incredible that Humble's employees intended
to voluntarily give up such valuable assets for no consideration
whatever.
On the basis of Louisiana law which provides that "mutual error of fact
is not necessary to abrogate a contract," and that "unilateral error is
sufficient," the release was rescinded.
C. Right ofLessee to Reform PartialRelease Made in Error.
In the case of a partial release which does not accurately describe
the acreage or depths being released or retained, the doctrine of
"reformation of a contract" would be available to reform the partial
release. There would seemingly be no need to resort to this remedy in the
case of a purposeful full release of a mineral lease as there is nothing left
to the contract to be reformed, unless the instrument was intended to be
only partial in its effect. Such was the case in Pan American Petroleum
Corporationv. Kessler."
If, upon a proper interpretation of a partial release, the instrument is
found by a party to not express the intention of the parties, an action
might lie to "reform" the partial release in order that it might be made to
express the true intention of the parties.
The doctrine of "reformation of a contract" was described by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Agurs v. Holt," as follows:
Reformation of a contract "is an equitable remedy and lies only to
correct mistakes or errors in written instruments when such
instruments, as written, do not express the true contract or
7

78
79

239 So.2d 400 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied 256 La. 915, 240 So.2d 375 (1970).
223 F.Supp. 883 (E.D. La. 1963).
232 La. 1026, 95 So.2d 644, 645-6 (1957).
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agreement of the parties. See Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 35
So.2d 219 [(1948)]. It is a personal action, even when applied to real
estate,... in which the burden is on the one seeking reformation to
establish the mutual error and mistake by clear and convincing
proof, parol evidence being admissible for this purpose.
The error "must be mutual"so and it must be "in the drafting of the
instrument . . . and not in making the contract which it evidences."'
A "mutual mistake" has been defined as "a mistake shared by both
parties to the instrument at the time of reducing their agreement to
writing, and the mistake is mutual if the contract has been written in
terms which violate the understanding of both parties; that is, if it
appears that both have done what neither intended.""
"A grantec of property succeeds to the original grantor's rights to
maintain a suit to reform a prior deed."83 However, a "third party taking
rights on the faith of the public record is protected and cannot be held to
provisions which might be contained in a document after it is reformed
for simple error."84
2.02 Abandonment of the Mineral Lease:
Another means by which a mineral lease might be extinguished is
by "abandonment."
"'Abandonment' of property or of a right is the voluntary
relinquishment thereof by its owner or holder, with the intention of
terminating his ownership, possession and control, and without vesting
ownership in any other person.""

A mineral lease was held to have been abandoned by a lessee under
the following facts as found by one court, 6 to-wit:
And the evidence in this case shows that plaintiff went upon the
land with a drilling outfit wholly inadequate to drill to the required
depth, and at the end of nine months had drilled only 900 feet,
which he might have done in as many days.

0 Pat S. Todd Oil Co. v. Wall, 581 So.2d 333, 336 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied
585 So.2d 569 (La.1991).
81
Phillips Oil Co. v. O.K.C. Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 275 (5th Cir.) (internal quotation
omitted), cert. deniei,484 U.S. 851, 108 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed.2d 107 (1987).
82
MR. Building Corporation v. Bayou Utilities, Inc., 25,759 (La.App. 2nd Cir.
5/4/94); 637 So.2d 614, 616.
8
Id. at 617.
4
Morrison v. D & L Partnership,499 So.2d 988, 990 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1986).
8s
Salim v. Louiiana State Board of Education, 289 So.2d 554 (La.App. 3rd Cir.
1974).
86
Wiley v. Davis, 164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928).
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It was on September 19, 1922, that plaintiff ceased entirely to do
any drilling whatsoever (having started about December 10, 1921),
and it was not until December 28, 1922 (being more than three
months after plaintiff had ceased drilling entirely and more than one
year after plaintiff had started), that defendants gave a new lease to
another party and notified plaintiff that they considered his lease
abandoned and canceled. And in our opinion they had waited quite
long enough. It is true that about the time defendant ceased drilling
as aforesaid (September, 1922) he sent Mrs. Davis the amount of the
rental for a renewal of the lease for one year, which she accepted
with the understanding that plaintiff was to continue drilling
diligently. But, as we have said, he did nothing after that during the
whole three months which elapsed before defendants leased to the
other party.
In Taussig v. GoldKing Properties Co.," the lessor contended that
the lessee abandoned the mineral lease by reason of the physical
plugging of five (5) wells, certain internal memoranda regarding such
activity and a release granted as to a one-half (1/2) interest in the lease.
The court noted that "there is no provision in the Mineral Code which
directly addresses 'abandonment' in the context of mineral law."" The
court cited Salim and held that there was no abandonment, stating, as
follows:
We find that the physical plugging and abandonment of the five
wells does not constitute proof of abandonment of the Mallett Bay
lease. These wells were required to be plugged and abandoned by
the regulations of the Louisiana Department of Conservation
because they no longer produced condensates and hydrocarbons in
paying quantities. Therefore, we conclude that the physical plugging
of the wells does not support any elements of abandonment.
Abandonment is rarely availed as a mode of extinguishment of a
mineral lease, probably for the reason that the circumstances which
might give rise to claim of abandonment would typically correspond to a
set of facts which would demonstrate the expiration of the term of the
mineral lease - a more solid basis for lease extinguishment.
III. Rights and Obligations Relative to Well Costs and to Production
before and after Recoupment of Such Costs
3.01 Obligation for Well Costs:
A. Preface.

495 So.2d 1008 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1986), writ denied 502 So.2d Ill (La. 1987).
The court cited Bickham v. Bussa Oil and Gas Corp., 152 So. 393 (La.App. 2nd
Cir. 1934).
87

8
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As noted in Section 1.02B above, produced oil and gas would
constitute a "product," and not a "fruit." A necessary consequence of this
fact is that the owner thereof is entitled to receive such oil and gas (or the
value thereof), but only upon the producer (operator) being reimbursed
for the costs incurred in producing such oil and gas. This proposition is
supported by both codal and jurisprudential authorities.
B. Codal Authority.
As previously observed, "[p]roducts derived from a thing as a result
of diminution of its substance belong to the owner of that thing. When
they are reclaimed by the owner, a possessor in good faith has the right
to reimbursement of his expenses. A possessor in bad faith does not have
this right.""
Given that the courts employ the principle of unjust enrichment to
resolve these issues between the operator (or producer) and the nonparticipating owner, further codal support can be found in Articles 2054
and 2055 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Article 2054:

When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it
must be Essumed that they intended to bind themselves not only to
the express provisions of the contract, but also to whatever the law,
equity, or usage regards as implied in a contract of that kind or
necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose.
Article 2C55 (first paragraph only):
Equity, as intended in .the preceding articles, is based on the
principles that no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another
and that no one is allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense
of another.
C. Jurisprudence.
The cases interpreting and applying the codal authority are legion.
In the early case of Martel v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate,"o the
court awarded the co-owner of the land "one-fifth of all the oil produced
... on said tract of land, on plaintiffs' reimbursing one-fifth of all the
expenses, ordinary and incidental, incurred in producing, transporting,
and preserving the same, and if sold, the additional expenses of the sale."
In the next case to consider the issue," it was held that the
landowner has the right to recover the value of the oil, gas or other
minerals from a person who unlawfully enters his land and extracts oil
and gas therefiom. If the trespasser acted in good faith, the amount of

90

Article 488, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
114 La. 903, 38 So. 612 (1905).

91

Cooke v. GuifRefining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914).

89
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damages is the value of the mineral at the well, less the cost of
production, which includes the cost of drilling.9 2
In Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers,93 plaintiff and defendant owned, in equal
proportions, a mineral lease. Defendant undertook to re-enter an
abandoned hole and the operation was successful.
The court stated the issue to be, as follows:
... [W]hether a cotenant of oil-bearing lands, who fails, neglects, or
refuses to contribute towards the exploration and development of
the field, may yet claim of his cotenant a proportionate share of the
oil produced (less expenses), when the latter has explored and
developed the field at his own sole risk and expense.
Thus, the court observed that the "sole matter involved is one-half
the produce of the aforesaid 'abandoned' well (less expenses)."
There was judgment in favor of the plaintiff (non-operator) and
defendant (producer) appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed. In so doing, it stated, as follows:
In this case the owner had ceded to defendant the exclusive right to
sever the oil from the realty and make it his own, and defendant had
in turn ceded a half interest to plaintiff. So that as soon as any oil
was severed from the soil it became lawfully the joint property of
plaintiff and defendant.
Citing Martel v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate,9 4 the court
affirmed the right of the co-owner (plaintiff) to receive its proportionate
share of the oil produced, subject to paying its proportionate share of the
expenses.
Freeman v. Depression Oil Co., Inc.9" provides a bit of analysis of
the then state of the law. There, one co-owner of a mineral lease sued
another co-owner, contending that, "since the acquisition by petitioner of
his interest in said lease he has, with the consent and agreement of its coowners, operated the well located upon the lands described, producing oil
therefrom for the joint benefit of the co-owners according to their
interests and with the understanding that he would be reimbursed the cost
of operation by the co-owners in proportion to their interests in the lease
described." In affirming the trial court judgment for the plaintiff, the
court explained its rationale, as follows:

In deciding the case, the court observed that "minerals under and within the soil of
Louisiana were not in the contemplation of the lawmakers at the time that the Code was
adopted."
9
152 La. 19, 92 So. 720 (1922).
94
Cited at footnote 90, supra.
"
159 So. 192 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1935).
92
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Plaintiff contends that since the lease was developed for the joint
benefit of all co-owners, and production was secured, that
defendant, by implied or quasi contract, is legally bound to pay its
proportionate pait of the expense properly incurred in attaining
these results, and cites in support of his position Martel v. JenningsHeywood Oil Syndicate, 114 La. 351, 38 So. 253; Allies Oil Co. v.
Ayers, 152 La. 19, 92 So. 720.
These two cases hold that where one colessee, on his own initiative,
or because the other colessee will not, or for financial or other
reasons, cannot join with him, develops a lease and secures
profitable production, the noncontributing lessee who claims his
proportionate part of the oil thus produced is bound to the
reimbursement of a like proportion of the expenses incurred to
secure tie production. In each of these cases production was very
valuable. It greatly exceeded the expense account incident thereto.
The principle upheld in these two cases is but the recognition of a
cardinal rule of equity. We have been cited to no case, and know of
none, which holds that the noncontributing colessee may be held,
without his consent, for a proportionate part of expense incurred in
"wild cat" ventures on a lease, or for any part of expense incurred in
bringing in a well whose production does not, when sold, repay all
such expenses. To hold that, regardless of the outcome of tests for
oil or gas by one colessee, the other colessee may be held for a proportionate part of the expense incurred in the unsuccessful venture,
would be tantamount to placing the less opulent or less informed
colessee wholly at the nercy of the better situated associate. The
interest of the noncontributing lessee could thereby be entirely
destroyed or absorbed by the more fortunate one; financial ruin or
forced sacrifice of his property rights would often result.
D. Rationale Embraced by the Courts in Requiring Reimbursement
of Costs.
Although the courts do not always articulate the precise rationale for
their decisiom, it is clear that the law of unjust enrichment is the basis on
which the courts rely." The Louisiana Supreme Court analyzed the
conceptual underpinnings of the action of unjust enrichment and
articulated the elements of the civil law action de in rem verso in
Minyard v. CurtisProducts,Inc.," as follows:

% "Neverthelcss, he may not enjoy the profits without participating in the expenses
incurred in producing those profits. To permit him to do so would violate the moral
maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another." Scott v.
Hunt Oil Company, 152 So.2d 599, 604 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1962), on appeal after
remand, 160 So.2d 433 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ denied 245 La. 950, 162 So.2d 8 (1964).
97
251 La. 624, 205 So.2d 422 (1967).

-
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There are now five prerequisites to the successful suit by actio de in
rem verso: (1) there must be an enrichment, (2) there must be an
impoverishment, (3) there must be a connection between the
enrichment and resulting impoverishment, (4) there must be an
absence of "justification" or "cause" for the enrichment and impoverishment, and finally (5) the action will only be allowed when there
is no other remedy at law, i.e., the action is subsidiary or corrective
in nature.
While the early cases noted hereinabove obviously predate this
decision, it accurately captures the essential elements of a cause of action
for unjust enrichment as historically recognized by the judiciary.
Applying these elements to the circumstance considered herein,
each seems to be met in the context of a non-participating owner who
seeks to recover its allocated share of production revenues free of
responsibility for any production costs, as follows:
(1) To allow a non-participating owner to receive its share of
production without any liability for costs would constitute an
enrichment of such owner;
(2) To allow a non-participating owner to receive its share of
production without any liability for costs would constitute an
impoverishment of the party who drilled the well at its sole cost,
risk and expense;
(3) The connection between the two is obvious;
(4) Neither the enrichment nor the impoverishment is justified,
standing alone; and
(5) By definition, there is no contractual relationship between the
parties.
The courts resort to the legal doctrine of unjust enrichment in the
case of a non-participating owner who seeks to recover its allocated
share of production revenues free of responsibility for any production
costs. However, courts have also found consent to the conduct of
operations by actions of the party seeking to avoid costs.
Thus, in Connette v. Wright," a co-owner of mineral leases was held
responsible for his share of drilling costs and supervision because
"execution of the division orders and the receipt of his share of the
proceeds of all of the oil produced and sold was a complete ratification
by defendant of the drilling operations conducted by plaintiff on the
whole property." This case illustrates the codal notion that a "contract is
formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and
acceptance," and that, in most cases, "offer and acceptance may be made

98

154 La. 1081, 98 So. 674 (1924).

-
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orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is
clearly indicative of consent.""
3.02 Responsibility for Well Costs After Release of Lease:
It is of the essence of the lessor-lessee relationship that all costs of
drilling, equipping and completing a well are borne by the lessee (the
"working interest" owner) to the end that the lessor is entitled to its
lessor's royalty free of such costs.'" Thus, during the existence of the
mineral lease, costs attributable to the lands burdened by the mineral
lease and situated within the compulsory unit are the responsibility of the
lessee, not the lessor.
Even if the: lessee is receiving no revenue from the producing unit
well (perhaps for the reason that it has not paid its share of costs to the
operator who, as a consequence, is entitled to withhold proceeds
attributable to the lands burdened by the mineral lease), the lessee
nonetheless has a contractual obligation to pay royalties to its lessor.o'" In
these instances, it is said that the lessee has to "go out of pocket."
Where costs are incurred during the existence of a mineral lease and
are in fact paid by the lessee to the operator, but the mineral lease
terminates prior to recoupment of such costs by the lessee, special issues
arise.
The attributes of an unleased mineral owner - his rights and
obligations - are not different merely because he was previously
leased.o 2 As stated by the district court judge in Browning v. Exxon
Corporation,"os

An expired mineral lease is just that, an expired lease. It is as though
the Browning lease had never been written. The Louisiana statutes
contain no exemption for 'recently leased, but now unleased, lands.'
These special issues were addressed in Williams v. Seneca
Resources Corp.'"
Article 1927, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
Frey v. Amoco Production Company, 603 So.2d 166, 173 (La. 1992) ("By virtue of
the beneficial relationship between lessee and lessor, the former avoids having to pay up
front for the privi.ege of exploration, and the latter, assuming a passive role, is
guaranteed participation in any eventual yield accruing from the lessee's entrepreneurial
efforts, unconstrained by financial and operational responsibilities.").
101 ". . . royalties paid to the lessor on production are rent. A mineral lessee is
obligated to make timely payment of rent according to the terms of the contract or the
custom of the mining industry in question if the contract is silent." Article 123, Louisiana
Mineral Code.
102
Except, of course, to the extent that the (now) unleased mineral owner has a claim
against the (former) mineral lessee which has not prescribed.
103
848 F.Supp. 1241 (M.D. La.), af'd43 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1994).
'
1991 WL 264562 (E.D. La. 1991).
"

'*0
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In Williams, the plaintiffs' lessee, Yuma, entered into an operating
agreement with Seneca, pursuant to which a well was drilled and then
unitized. Yuma paid to Seneca, the operator, the share of well costs
applicable to the lands covered by the Williams lease. After completion,
the well was shut-in for lack of a pipeline connection. Apparently, Yuma
failed to make a timely shut-in rental payment as required by the lease,
which thereupon terminated.
After production began, Seneca, as operator, withheld proceeds
allocable to the Williams tract in order to reimburse Yuma, the Williams'
former lessee. Williams sued Seneca to establish that Seneca had no right
to withhold proceeds of unit production allocable to the Williams tract.
Noting that "the costs associated with the Williams' tract have been
paid already by Yuma," the court found that "Seneca does not have the
right to collect the development costs incurred during the Lease from the
Williams." The court recognized that, because the lease was in force and
effect during the period of time that the well costs were incurred, it was
the responsibility of Yuma, the lessee, to bear those costs.
These issues were next visited in Shanks v. Exxon Corporation
("Shanks P).os Exchange Oil & Gas Corporation held a mineral lease on
a tract of land which was subsequently placed in a unit around a well, as
a result of which, obligations accrued for the payment of well costs to
Exxon, the operator of the well.
Because there was no contractual relationship between Exchange
and Exxon, the latter withheld the proceeds of production attributable to
Exchange's unitized premises in order to recoup that tract's
proportionate share of well costs.
Exchange paid royalties "out of pocket" to its lessors for some
period of time until it made the decision that the well would not "pay
out" and elected to simply release the lease in order to be relieved of any
further responsibility in connection therewith.
Since that previously leased tract's share of well costs had not yet
been fully recouped by the operator, Exxon continued withholding such
costs from the post-release share of production now owned by the
plaintiffs (Exchange's former lessors) in their capacity as unleased
mineral owners.
The plaintiffs sued TXP (as successor to Exchange's interest in the
lease) for such well costs, arguing that such costs were "incurred" during
the existence of the lease and, therefore, were the responsibility of the
lessee.

95-2164 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/10/96); 674 So.2d 473, writ denied 96-1475 (La.
9/20/96); 679 So.2d 436.
05
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TXP defernded by asserting that it was relieved of this responsibility
prospectively flom the date of the release. TXP argued that, since Exxon
could only recoup such funds by withholding production attributable to
the tract in question, the obligation arose only as and to the extent that
production was. actually obtained and, therefore, it had no personal
obligation to continue paying for such well costs after the release.
The court agreed with TXP and found that the release of the lease
resulted in the discharge of the (former) lessee's further obligations in
connection therewith, including those dealing with well costs.
The court liarther explained its rationale, as follows:
While the f'actual situation in Davis"o' differed from the facts herein,
we -believe that the pronouncements therein are nonetheless
controlling. Applying the dictates of Davis, we conclude that
liability for well costs does not necessarily accrue at the time the
costs are incurred. Moreover, even the inclusion of the leased lands
at issue within the compulsory unit did not, of itself, render TXP
liable for well costs. Pursuant to Davis, TXP had no liability for
well costs, but was only liable for such costs out of production.
TXP's liability for well costs accrued only as there was production
from the unit well and only to the extent of its proportionate share of
production. TXP's, or Exchange's, entire proportionate share of
production was applied to the payment of well costs during the
existence of the leases. Thus, we conclude that TXP paid all well
costs for which it was liable by law.
The identical set of facts as was considered in Shanks I gave rise to
another decisior in the same case against another defendant. In Shanks v.
Exxon Corporaion("Shanks Il"), o7 the plaintiff sought relief against C.

T. Carden, the original lessee who later assigned the lease to Exchange,
which interest was later assigned to TXP. "Because the principal
defendant in thi:s matter was TXP, all of the parties agreed to sever their
claims against Exxon and the Cardens, both as to the original claim and
the incidental claims." Shanks II takes up the previously severed claim
against Carden.
After its claims against TXP were dismissed in Shanks I, the
plaintiffs pursued their original lessee, C. T. Carden. The character of the
plaintiffs' claim against this defendant was stated, as follows:
Plaintiffs tlen filed the instant appeal, contending that the trial court
erred in: (1) holding that "the issues presented are the same" in this
case against mineral lessee Carden as in the case of sublessee TXP

10

Davis Oil Copnpany v. Steamboat Petroleum Corporation, 583 So.2d 1139 (La.

1991).
107

2007-0852 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/21/07); _ So.2d _.
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in the earlier trial as reported in Shanks [1]; (2) finding that "this
situation has already been dealt with by this court and by the Ist
Circuit" and failing to recognize the distinction between the
personal, contractual liability of the mineral lessee, Carden, to
plaintiff-lessors for payment of well drilling costs and the limited, in
rem liability of sublessee TXP, as decided in Shanks [1] on the basis
of oil and gas unitization law; and (3) failing to recognize and apply
the provisions of the Mineral Code in that the lessee-sublessor
Carden "is not relieved of his obligations or liabilities under a
mineral lease unless the lessor has discharged him expressly and in
writing," LSA-R.S. 31:129, as distinguished from a sublessee who
assumed only an in rem interest in the lease and whose
responsibility to the lessor is limited "to the extent of the interest
acquired," LSA-R.S. 31:128.
The court stated the issue in Shanks II to be, as follows:
Thus, as was the case in Shanks [I], the primary issue now before us
is when liability for well costs, incurred for a well drilled on
someone else's property prior to unitization, becomes chargeable to
an owner (or lessee) who did not consent to unitization or to the
drilling activities of the operating owner.
Holding to its determination in Shanks I that the obligation of a nonconsenting owner to pay well costs only arises as and when - and to the
extent that - production is captured, the court in Shanks II again rejected
plaintiffs' demands against Carden, saying, as follows:
Inasmuch as liability for the remaining unpaid well costs
-attributable to the tracts of land covered by the leases was a future
obligation, i.e., a liability only incurred as the unit well produced
and only to the extent of the proportionate share of production,
Carden was relieved of this future obligation by execution of the
release in accordance with the provisions of the leases. See Shanks
[1], 674 So.2d at 478.
3.03 Nature of Non-Participating Owner's Obligation for Well Costs:
In the absence of a contractual relationship to the contrary, a nonparticipating owner may not receive its allocated share of unit production
unless it pays for its allocated share of unit well costs. As a general
statement, at its option, the non-participating owner may pay its share of
costs in cash or may require the operator to be reimbursed out of
production. If the latter option is exercised, the risk that the well will
never achieve "payout" is on the operator.
The jurisprudence recognizes an exception to this rule. If the nonparticipating owner is participating in the compulsory unit as a consequence of action which it took in connection with the creation or revision
of the unit, the courts have held that such an owner may be liable "out of

-
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pocket" to the operator. Under these circumstances, the risk that the well
will never achieve "payout" shifts to the non-participating owner who
may be required to pay its share of costs in cash.
The principal case which establishes this exception is The Superior
Oil Company v. Humble Oil & Refining Company.os Therein, the
plaintiff-operator sued the defendant to recover a sum of money as
defendant's proportionate part of the cost of drilling and completing a
unit well. The well was drilled by plaintiff and the defendant applied for
a compulsory un:.t which was created and which included a portion of
lands held under lease by defendant. The issue presented was stated by
the court, as follows:
Plaintiff contends it is entitled to recover the proportionate part of
the adjusted well costs from the defendant in cash. To the contrary,
defendant contends there is no authority for plaintiff to recover in
cash, but only from the proceeds of production from the well
accruing to defendant.
The court stated it to be "obvious that, if [defendant]'s contention is
maintained, it will have obtained a substantial advantage over [plaintiffoperator], in that the well satisfies its obligation to its lessor to develop
and that it will ultimately receive its share of the proceeds thereof, all
without the outlay of one penny." Further, the court stated:
The suggestion that payment will ultimately be made from proceeds
of production is not an answer to this situation, as [plaintiffoperator] will then be required to finance [defendant] during the
entire time required to obtain reimbursement from proceeds of
production. ::n short, [plaintiff-operator] alone will have been
required to make the entire investment, whereas the return will
accrue only partly to it, and partly to [defendant].
The court in Superior v. Humble rejected defendant's contention
that the Supreme Court, in Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHugh,'" had
"establish[ed] the rule that withholding the proceeds from the production
of a well is the only method the driller of a unitized well may recover the
proportionate cost of drilling from the owners included in the unit." The
court stated that Hunter, while recognizing the operator's right to
withhold proceeds of unit production as a means of recovering well costs
attributable to a unit participation, "did not . . . make this remedy

exclusive."
Interestingly, the defendant (corporate predecessor to .today's
ExxonMobil Corporation) argued that "a poor and impecunious owner
may be subjected to heavy costs he is unable to pay if required to pay
1on

165 So.2d 905 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied 246 La. 842, 167 So.2d 668 (1964).

10"

202 La. 97, 11 Sc.2d 495 (1943).
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cash in the hope of continued production." The court gave short shrift to
this argument, noting that the issue "cannot be considered until the
answer of defendant and the trial discloses whether or not defendant is
impecunious and why it initiated the unitization by the Commission."
In denying an application for rehearing, the court stated that its
"decision at this time is limited to the case where the non-drilling owner
and/or lessee has demanded the unitization, and no further."
The rationale of the court in the Superior v. Humble case was
further explained in its denial of rehearing,"o as follows:
To compel an owner and/or his mineral lessee to share the
production from their well with the. adjoining unitized owners
and/or mineral lessees, without requiring immediate payment of the
latters' pro rata cost of drilling and production, but limiting recovery
solely from the adjoining owners' pro rata of production would, in
effect, be unjust enrichment of the latter and the taking of property
of the producing owner or lessee for the gain of the adjoining
owners or lessees without adequate compensation,

. .

. In such case

the producing owner and/or his lessee would be compelled to
assume the entire risk of production, and the financing of the pro
rata cost that should be borne by the non-drilling unitized adjoining
owners and/or lessees.
Subsequent to the decision in the Superior v. Humble case, it was
unclear as to what actions on the part of the non-participating owner
would be sufficient to invoke the rule, exposing it to personal liability to
the operator. If the non-participating owner actually made application for
the unit in order to "force" itself into the operator's production, that was
the easy case. But what if the non-participating owner - while not
actually applying for the unit - offered a counter-plan or presented
testimony or made a statement in reference to an application filed by the
operator? Would this be sufficient?
The next case to explore the reach of this stated limitation was
Davis Oil Company v. Steamboat Petroleum Corporation."' Plaintiff,
owner of certain leases, filed an application with the Office of
Conservation to form units for wells to be drilled by plaintiff. Defendant,
as the adjacent lessee, filed a counter-plan which opposed the plaintiffoperator's plan and urged the Commissioner to adopt defendant's
unitization plan. The Commissioner's unitization order established two
(2) units, each of which included small parts of lands leased by
defendant.

1o

165 So.2d at 910-1.

"'

583 So.2d 1139 (La. 1991).
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Plaintiff drilled a well in each unit, both of which were dry holes.
The defendant refused to participate in drilling of each well, and the
operator submitted invoices to the defendant for its proportionate share
of unit drilling costs. When the defendant refused to pay, plaintiff filed a
suit against the defendant for a money judgment representing a
proportionate par: of costs incurred by plaintiff in the drilling of wells in
the units which contained defendant's leases.
The court of served that "the present case is distinguishable from a
situation such as that presented in" the Superior v. Humble case. The
court stated, as fo lows:
Under the circumstances of the Superior Oil Co. case, Humble's
actions in taking the initiative to form an operating unit including an
already producing well resulting from Superior's successful
operations reasonably can be interpreted only as implying Humble's
consent to those operations. On the other hand, in the present case,
Steamboat's :nere participation in the regulatory unitization process
in the form of a defensive request for a modification in the drilling
units being formed at the initiative of Davis Oil in order to prevent
uncompensate.d drainage of fractions of the land under Steamboat's
leases does not constitute tacit consent to the operations.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not personally
liable for unit well costs, stating, as follows:
A non-operating owner of a mineral interest, who does not consent
to operations within a compulsory drilling unit by an operating
owner, has no liability for the costs of development and operations
except out of his share of production. Under the circumstances of
the present case, in which the non-operating lessee merely introduced a counter-proposed unit plan at the Commissioner's hearing,
prior to the drilling of the dry holes, only as a precaution against the
uncompensated drainage of part of the land underlying its leases, the
lessee did not consent to the unit operations.
Thus, in the absence of a special agreement with the operator'12 or,
in a proper case, application of the rule of the Superior v. Humble, the
obligation of a non -participating owner to bear its allocated proportionate
share of unit well costs is an in rem obligation to be discharged out of its
share of production, when, as and if produced. Therefore, if the value of
the unit production allocable to the non-participating owner is not
sufficient to discharge such owner's allocated portion of unit well costs,
the mineral owner has no personal liability to the operator for the
"special agreement" might take a variety of forms, including a "cost
contribution agreement," a "bottom hole agreement," a "dry hole agreement," or some
other contractual arrangement whereby a party agrees to financially support the efforts of
the operator.
112

This

Published by LSU Law Digital Commons,-2008
87 -

29

Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 7

shortfall or deficiency. In this sense, the risk of not achieving "payout" is
on the operator who undertook the drilling operations.
One approach which your author has observed in an attempt to
circumvent the rule of Superior v. Humble - (or is that "gimmick"?) -is
to make application for the formation of a compulsory unit in the name
of the owner of a non-cost bearing interest (such as a mineral royalty
interest or perhaps an overriding royalty interest). The Rules of
Procedure of the Commissioner"'. recognize that the application may be
filed by a "person,"" 4 with no stated limitation on his or its proprietary
position. The rationale is that the applicant in such a case is not a
"person" who, under general law, might be held responsible for costs.
Whether or not this approach is successful remains to be seen.
3.04 Definition of "Payout"
A. General.
As this paper demonstrates, the respective rights and obligations of
both the non-participating owner and the operator differ - or are certainly
adjusted - at the point in time when the operator has recovered its costs
out of production. This is so because, until the operator recovers its well
costs out of production, the non-participating owner will not participate
in unit production. That is to say, the operator retains all production
allocable to the unleased interest prior to the point when it has recouped
its costs.
The point in time at which the operator has recovered its costs out of
production is called "payout." The terms "before payout" (or "BPO")
and "after payout" (or "APO") are well known in the industry.
Thus, it is said that a well reaches or achieves "payout" when the
value of production allocable to the unleased mineral interest equals the
proportionate part of drilling and other costs allocable to that unleased
mineral interest. At that point in time, it is said that the owner of the
unleased mineral interest is entitled to receive "eight-eighths," or one
hundred (100%) per cent, of production allocable to its interest, subject
to the ongoing responsibility to bear a proportionate part of unit
operating expenses.
This point in time is determined when a certain amount of revenue
equals a certain amount of costs. As in the case of a production in
"paying quantities" analysis, the issue becomes, "what revenue and what
costs?""11
Rules of Procedure for Conducting Hearings Before the Commissioner of
Conservation of the State ofLouisiana,effective October 11, 1983.
114
Person" means any natural person, corporation, association, partnership, receiver,
tutor, curator, administrator, fiduciary, or representative of any kind. La. R.S. 30:3(3).
"1s
See Ottinger, Production in "Paying Quantities" - A Fresh Look, 51st Ann. Inst.
on Min. Law 24 (2004); also published at 65 La. L.Rev. 635 (2005).
113
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B. Revenue to be Applied to Recoupment.
But, how is "payout" defined? What portion of monies is considered
in determining if "payout" has occurred?
Although there is no reported decision precisely on point,"' it
should include the entirety (i.e., "8/8ths") of unit production secured
from the borehole of the unit well, not merely the monies allocable to the
net revenue interest of the operator (and its partners) after deduction of
Lessor's royalties. In other words, the revenue stream to be considered
should include revenue attributable to Lessor's royalties, i.e., the
unleased owner should get the 'benefit' of that production (in the sense
that it is applied toward achievement of "payout") even though the
operator does not personally get the benefit of it. This is so because it is
not a concern to (nor the "fault of") the non-participating owner that the
operator (lessee) has a contractual obligation to others for the payment of
royalties.
C. Types or Categoriesof Costs Which Unit Operatoris Entitled to
Recoup O t ofProduction.
The operatDr is not free to recoup just any cost or expense from the
non-participating owner's allocated share of production. The
determinative fictor seems to be that, in order to be recovered by the
operator, an expenditure must have been actually incurred in connection
with unit operations and be reasonable.
There is no statutory definition of "payout" or how it is
determined."' 'he closest statutory analogy in the Conservation Act
provides that the operator availing itself of the benefits of the Risk Fee
Statute"' is entided to recover from the share of production allocable to a
party who did not share in the cost, risk and expense of the well, "the
actual reasonable expenditures incurred in drilling, testing, completing,
equipping, and .operating the unit well, including a charge for
supervision.""'
But see Gulf Explorer, LLC v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., 2006-1949 (La.App.
1st Cir. 6/8/07); 964 So.2d 1042, discussed in Section 3.06C, infra.
117
There is a definition of "payout" for purposes of a statutory exemption from
severance taxes in connection with the drilling of a "horizontal well," La. R.S.
47:633(7)(c)(iii), a "deep well," La. R.S. 47:633(9)(d)(v), and a "new discovery well,"
La. R.S. 47:648.3. For these purposes, LAC 61:1.2903 defines "payout" as occurring
"when gross revenuo from the well, less royalties and operating costs directly attributable
to the well, equals the well cost as approved by the Office of Conservation. Operating
costs are limited to those costs directly attributable to the operation of the exempt well,
such as direct mateiials, supplies, fuel, direct labor, contract labor or services, repairs,
maintenance, property taxes, insurance, depreciation, and any other costs that can be
directly attributed tc the operation of the well. Operating costs do not include any costs
that were included in the well cost approved by the Office of Conservation."
"
See Section 7.02 hereof, infra.
116

119

La. R.S. 30:10 A(2)(b)(1).
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A further limitation on eligible costs is provided in La. R.S. 30:111
which reads, as follows:
Owners of unleased mineral interests and lessees in any drilling unit
authorized by the department of conservation of this state, shall not
be liable or obligated to pay to the operator or producer for materials
furnished or used in the drilling, completion, and production of any
oil, gas, or mineral well drilled on said unit a sum in excess of the
prevailing market price of such materials.
A cost incurred by an operator which is not related to unit
operations, but is merely incurred out of self-interest to the operator
would not be deemed to be a necessary or "reasonable" expenditure.
An anecdotal incident would illustrate this point. Your author is
familiar with a situation wherein an operator (a major oil company)
sought to conduct a gravel pack operation in a field and sought to impose
a share of the costs upon a non-operator (a smaller independent E&P
company). The operator announced its intention to charge the nonoperator its proportionate share of an amount of money which, in the
opinion of the non-operator, greatly exceeded (perhaps by a magnitude
of ten-fold) the "going cost" for such an operation. The non-operator did
not disagree that a gravel pack operation was appropriate, but simply
questioned the scope and associated cost of the operation as proposed by
the operator. After resisting such significantly higher costs, the nonoperator finally learned that the operator desired to conduct a "new" and
"modem" operation as an experiment to see how it worked, before
conducting it on its own, solely owned facility in the Gulf of Mexico.
Non-operators rarely enjoy being a guinea pig, particularly at their own
expense.
Costs for which a non-participating owner is responsible will
include its proportionate part of drilling costs associated with drilling to a
deeper, but non-productive, depth, prior to a "plug back" to a shallower
depth where the well was completed. 120 As this was a "lease basis" well,
issues of well cost adjustments were not presented as in the case of a unit
operation.
An illustration of the meaning of "actual reasonable expenditure"
was discussed by Robert T. Jorden, a leading authority on Louisiana
conservation law, in the proceedings before the Mineral Law Institute,"'
as follows:
Martel v. Hunt, 195 La. 701, 197 So. 402, 409 (1940) ("It cannot be-said that the
drilling of the well to the greater depth was an act of bad faith, and we are not in position
to say that the companies used poor judgment in doing so. The companies were
endeavoring to make the most of their investment. They were exploring for oil, and the
costs of their explorations amounted to nearly $65,000, and plaintiffs must contribute
their pro rata share of this amount.").
121
Jorden, Unit Well Costs, 14th Ann. Inst. on Min. Law 15, 16 (1967).
120
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When considering unit well costs, it is necessary to determine what
is meani by "actual reasonable expenditures," and the
Commissioner of Conservation has on at least one occasion
considered this language and issued a rather interesting and
reasonable ruling. In the Greenwood-Waskom Field, the operator
drilled a unit well shortly after World War II and used pipe which
was difficult to obtain and which cost considerably more money
than the pipe normally used in wells in the area. However, the
evidence established that the less expensive pipe was not available
and that the operator had been reasonable in using special pipe. The
Commissioner of Conservation, therefore, found that these were
actual, reasonable expenditures which should be used in
determining the well costs.
3.05 Unit Well Cost Adjustments:
A. Preface
Until a well, drilled on a "lease basis," is unitized, only the lessor
and the lessee(s) of the drillsite tract are entitled to participate in
production from that well. 2 As a corollary, the lessee which drilled the
well on its own lease is entitled to all of the net revenue interest
attributable to the working interest and will apply such revenue to its
own reimbursement of its capital or "sunk" costs.
If that "lease basis" well is drilled at a location which is in
compliance with the spacing regulations promulgated by the Louisiana
Office of Conservation, 23 unitization is not mandated. Yet, any
interested person may seek unitization in order to include some or all of
its leased premises in a unit for such well.'"2
Customarily, a unit order will be made effective as of the date of the
hearing which results in the formation of the unit.' Production
subsequent to the effective date of the unit is unit production in which all
unit participants participate.
With respect to pre-unitization production, to what extent does the
mineral owner of a tract brought into the unit get any benefit thereof?
This may occut in a variety of ways, including (but not limited to) the
following scenarios):
Pierce v. GoliKing Properties,Inc., 396 So.2d 528 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied
400 So.2d 904 (La. 1981) ("Although drainage of plaintiffs lands may have occurred
during the relatively short span of time between initial production of the [later unitized]
well and unitization, plaintiff is still not entitled to receive royalties until such time as the
effective date of the unit.").
123
See LAC 43:XIX.1902, et seq., called Statewide Order No. 29-E.
124
La. R.S. 30:10A(1).
125 Exxon Corporationv. Thompson, 564 So.2d 387 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 568
122

So.2d 1054 (La. 1990).
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0
When a well produces on a "lease basis" for a period of time
prior to unitization;
* When a unit well produces for a period of time prior to a
revision of the unit, and if, as a consequence of the revision, a new
or additional tract of land not under lease to the operator is included
within the unit;
When a well produces on a unit basis from a deeper zone or
horizon and, after depletion from that deeper zone or horizon, the
well is then "plugged back" to a shallower zone or horizon which is
unitized and in which a party is included who had either not participated at all in the deeper production, or participated on a different
equity basis than in the shallower depth, or vice versa (shallow to
deep).
In each of these instances, the occasion arises for an "adjustment" or
"depreciation" of the unit well costs for which the newly added tract of
land will be responsible.
The rationale is that, while the owner of the newly added lease or
unleased land has the obligation to compensate the operator for the costs
of the unit well which is now benefiting the new owner,'2 6 the operator
- having recovered some portion of the costs of drilling the unit well
out of pre-unitization production - is only entitled to recover "adjusted"
or "depreciated" well costs from the newly unitized lease owner. This is
customarily based upon a determination of the percentage of the reserves
of the entire well produced by the operator prior to unitization or reunitization.
La. R.S. 30: 1OA(2)(c) originally provided "that the cost of drilling,
testing, completing, equipping, and operating the unit well shall be
reduced to accountfor monies receivedfrom priorproduction, if any, in
which said tract or tracts did not participate prior to determining the
share of cost allocable to such tract or tracts." (Emphasis added.).
The language employed in this statute was not precisely clear in that
it is not certain as to what is meant by the statement that costs "shall be
reduced to accountfor" prior production. Did the language mean that the
well costs must be reduced "dollar for dollar" or may some other method
of well cost adjustment be utilized, e.g., "reservoir depletion"? This issue
was considered by the Commissioner in a series of well cost hearings.
B. Authority of Commissioner of Conservation to Determine Well
Costs.
If the parties are unable to reach agreement as to the amount of well
costs chargeable to the newly unitized lease owner, the Commissioner of
General Gas Corporation v. Continental Oil Company, 230 So.2d 906 (La.App. 1st
Cir. 1970).
126
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Conservation may "determine" the well costs.127 The Commissioner's
authority to determine "proper [well] costs" does not include the
authority to adjudicate the manner in which such costs are to be adjusted
or apportioned among the various unit participants.128 Moreover, the
Commissioner has no authority to render a money judgment for such
costs as that is a judicial (not an administrative) function.' 29
C. Commissioner's Early Approach to Well Cost Hearings.
For many years, the Commissioner simply refused to. schedule a
well cost hearing despite the receipt of a proper application therefor. The
motivation was not that he lacked authority to "determine" well costs he clearly had the statutory authority to do so. Rather, by failing or
refusing to hold a hearing in respect of an application to determine well
costs (a position which no operator desired to challenge), parties tended
to resolve the matters amicably without the intervention of the
Commissioner.
An apparnt change of heart led to a series of unit well cost hearings
in 1990.
In a series of Orders issued on August 22, 1990, the Commissioner
of Conservation determined that the legislative directive meant that "the
actual reasonable cost . . . should be reduced by the dollar amount of

monies received from the prior production in which the tract included in
the unit did not participate less severance tax, in determining the share of
cost allocable to said tract."130
The Commissioner further found that "the dollar for dollar reduction
to be required. herein followp the guidance of LSA-CC Art. 9, and is
consistent with the concept enunciated by the court in the case of"
Desormeaux v Inexco Oil Co.13 1
In another hearing,132 the Commissioner found that "the monies
received from prior production [having] exceeded the actual reasonable
La. R.S. 30:10A(l)(f).
Desormeau;: v. Inexco Oil Company, 277 So.2d 218, 220 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1973),
appeal after remcnd, 298 So.2d 897 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied 302 So.2d 37 (La.
1974).
129
Anisman v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Company, 98 So.2d 603, 605 (La.App. 2nd Cir.
1957) ("It should also be pointed out that the Commissioner of Conservation has no
interest, nor is he officially involved in plaintiffs action for an accounting.").
130
See Order No. 860-1 dated August 22, 1990, effective July 12, 1990, relative to the
calculation of unit well costs for the GER RD SUA in the Iberia Field, Iberia Parish,
Louisiana.
131 298 So.2d 8)7 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ refused 302 So.2d 37 (La. 1974).
132 See Order No. 1086-1 dated August 22, 1990, effective July 25, 1990, concerning
the calculation of proper unit well costs for the 6900' RA SUA, Chandeleur Sound Block
71 Field, St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana.
127
128

-

Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008

93

-

35

Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 7

expenditures incurred in the drilling, testing, completing, equipping and
operation" of the unit well, to the end that "the depreciated well cost" as
a consequence of a revision of the unit "was zero dollars."
D. Legislative Response to Hearings.
To clarify this issue, La. R.S. 30:10A(2)(c) was amended' to
provide that "the cost of drilling, testing, completing, equipping, and
operating the well allocable to each tract included in the unit shall be
reduced in the same proportion as the recoverable reserves in the unitized
pool have been recovered by prior production, if any, in which said tract
or tracts did not participate prior to determining the share of cost
allocable to such tract or tracts."
A similar statutory provision addresses unit revisions which either
includes "an additional tract or tracts," or excludes a tract or tracts. 34
E. Methods of Well Cost Adjustment.
An example would assist in understanding this statute as it currently
exists. If a well is drilled for $2 million and produces for a period of time
prior to unitization, the owner of a tract brought into the unit would be
able to demand an "adjustment" or "depreciation" of the well costs for
which it might be responsible. The rationale is that the operator has
already received value from the well to the extent that it produced on a
"lease basis" and some credit (by way of reduction or "adjustment" of
well costs) should be due to the party who is now responsible to bear a
portion of costs for a "used" well.1"
A typical - but by no means exclusive - approach is the "unit of
production depreciated well cost method." Under this method, it is
necessary to estimate the total reserves in the reservoir which is now
unitized and determine the percentage of those reserves which were
produced prior to unitization. If the reserves are estimated to be 4 million
barrels of oil and the operator had produced 50 thousand barrels prior to
unitization, the (now unit) well had been "used" and "enjoyed," prior to
unitization, to the extent of 50,000/4,000,000 (or 5/400, or 1.25%) of its
estimated total useful life. Thus, on the effective date of unitization, unit
well costs should be reduced by that percentage, such that the nonparticipating owner is only responsible for its proportionate part of
98.75% of $2,000,000.
Act No. 595 of 1991 Louisiana Legislature.
134
La. R.S. 30:1OA(2)(d), as amended by Act No. 595 of 1991 Louisiana Legislature.
135 An operator's contention that the working interest owner whose lease was unitized
with a well which produced prior to unitization "should be required to pay their
respective shares of the original cost of the well" "is not tenable . . . because the working
interest owners are not buying into a new well but are buying into a secondhand well and
they should not be made to pay for a new well." Hussey, Conservation Developments of
the Year, 6th Ann. Inst. on Min. Law 157, 172 (1958).
1
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If the well has encountered multiple pay zones, your author would
suggest that the total reserves should be taken into consideration.
It should be noted that this is but one of several models which might
be used to "adjust" or "depreciate" well costs to account for preunitization production.' 36
The Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies ("COPAS") has
published its Bulletin No. 2, entitled "Determination of Values for Well
Cost Adjustments - Joint Operations." Its Foreword states that its ."basic
purpose ... is to set forth what is considered by the industry in general to
be the most equitable basis for the determination of values to be used in
connection with well cost adjustments." In the absence of statutory law
addressing the proper methodology of well cost adjustments, this
COPAS Bulletin would seemingly be accepted as evidence of the custom
and usage in tie industry. 37
F. Jurispnudence.
The most recent decision relative to the issue of "adjustment" or
"depreciation" of unit well costs is Tex/Con Oil and Gas Company v.
Batchelor.'3 1 In Tex/Con, certain units in the South Lake Arthur Field
were revised by the Commissioner of Conservation. As a consequence of
these unit revisions, certain acreage held under lease by Tex/Con was
excluded from, and certain acreage held under lease by Hunt was
included in, the revised units. Pre-revision unit production significantly
exceeded the reasonable unit well costs for the units in question.
Tex/Con filed an application with the Commissioner of
Conservation 'for a determination of: (1) the reasonable actual cost of
each of the [unit] wells; (2) the depreciated cost for each well; and (3)
whether a well cost adjustment should be made among the former and
present ownern of these units."
After a public hearing, the Commissioner concluded that, pursuant
to La. R.S. .0:10 and consistent with the principles enunciated in
13 See Jorden, Unit Well Costs, 14th Ann. Inst. on Min. Law 15 (1967) and Jorden,
Unit Well Cost Agiustment in Louisiana, 38th Ann. Inst. on Min. Law 81 (1991).
'3
"When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it must be assumed
that they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract,
but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a contract of that kind
or necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose." Article 2054, Louisiana Revised
Civil Code.
"Equity, as intended in the preceding articles, is based on the principles that no one is
allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another. Usage, as intended in the preceding articles, is a
practice regularly observed in affairs of a nature identical or similar to the object of a
contract subject to interpretation." Article 2055, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
138
634 So.2d 502 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied 94-0270 (La. 3/18/94); 635
So.2d 1102.

-
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Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Company,"' it was necessary to apply the
"dollar-for-dollar" method of well cost adjustment. Finding that "the
monies received from production exceeded the reasonable well costs for
each well," the Commissioner concluded that "the cost chargeable by the
owners of the original units to the subsequent owners of the revised units
was zero."
Tex/Con filed a suit for judicial review.14 0 The trial court ruled that,
as a matter of law, La. R.S. 30:10A(2) and the custom and usage of the
oil and gas industry "require that the unit of production depreciated well
cost method of accounting be applied to determine depreciated unit well
costs" and that, accordingly, "the Commissioner erred in finding that
application of the dollar-for-dollar method to determine unit well costs
was consistent with the Desormeaux case." The trial judge remanded the
matter to the Commissioner "with instructions to adjust well costs for the
subject wells by applying the unit of production depreciated well cost
method."
The Commissioner and Hunt appealed. The Court of Appeal, First
Circuit, stated that the principal issue on appeal was "whether the
Commissioner erred in applying the dollar-for-dollar method in
determining whether any well cost adjustment was due under LSA-R.S.
30:10 A(2)." The court defined the competing methods, as follows:
Under the dollar-for-dollar method, well costs are reduced by the
dollar amount of monies received from production prior to the unit
revision, before any well cost adjustment is made between the
parties. Robert T. Jorden, Unit Well Cost Adjustment in Louisiana,
38 La.Min.L.Inst. 82, 90-91 (1992). The unit of production
depreciated well cost method contemplates reduction of well costs
by the percentage of depletion of the unit's total recoverable
reserves caused by production prior to unit revision. 38
La.Min.L.Inst. at 85.
The court particularly noted that the relevant statute was amended in
1991.'' The court applied the pre-amendment version of the statute,

saying that it was "effective at all times pertinent hereto." The court
stated, as follows:
We find, as did the Commissioner, that the wording of this statute
mandated that the Commissioner apply the dollar-for-dollar nethod
of depreciation. The statute, as it existed at the time this dispute
arose, dictated that well costs "be reduced to account for monies
received from prior production," phraseology which we agree
13

Cited at footnote 131, supra.

1'

See La. R.S. 30:12.

141

La. R.S. 30: 1OA(2)(d), amended by Act No. 595 of the 1991 Louisiana Legislature.
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clearly contemplated use of the dollar-for-dollar method of
determining well costs. Nothing in the wording of the statute, in its
previous form, suggested or required that well costs were to be
depreciated by the percentage of recoverable reserves that had been
recovered by prior production.... Thus, under the clear wording of
the statute, the Commissioner was required to use the dollar-fordollar method in determining depreciated well costs.
In reference to the post-amendment statute (effective in 1991), the
court observed that the amendment "change[d] the phrase 'shall be
reduced to account for monies received from prior production' to 'shall
be reduced in -:he same proportion as the recoverable reserves in the
unitized pool have been recovered by prior production."' In recognition
of this change, the court stated, as follows:
This amendment evidences a clear change in the method of
determinin3 well costs to a unit of production well cost reduction
method and provides further support for the conclusion that prior to
this 1991 Emendment, LSA-R.S. 30:12A(2)(d) mandated the use of
the dollar-for-dollar method.
3.06 Paramount Right of Unit Operator to Withhold Proceeds:
A. Preface.

From the viewpoint of the operator, the optimum circumstance
exists when it holds mineral leases on all lands in the unit and drills the
well at its sole cost, risk and expense, with or without partners. In that
instance, the operator bears all costs, sells all production and pays
royalties to its lessor(s), retaining the net revenue attributable to the
working interesi: for itself and its partners, if any.
In an instance where there is any land or interest which is not under
lease to the or erator [either because there is no lease at all - truly
"unleased" - or a tract or land (or interest therein) is leased to a third
party with whom the operator has no contractual relationship], the
operator must quantify that unleased interest in order to make an
economic decision as to whether it is willing to assume the risk
associated with such unleased interest. If the well is a dry hole, the
operator will bcar all costs, including those attributable to the unleased
interest with no opportunity to recoup its costs.
B. Jurisprudence.
Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHughl4 is a case wherein the constitutionality

of the Conservation Act was challenged. In that case, the court addressed
the plaintiffs contention that the Conservation Actl 43 was invalid
Cited at footnote 109, supra.
143
Enacted by Act No. 157 of the 1940 Louisiana Legislature, now codified in La.
R.S. 30:1, et seq.
142
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because, among other things, it made "no provision . .. for collecting or

enforcing" the operator's right of reimbursement of drilling costs. The
Supreme Court rejected this contention by noting that "[t]he answer to
this [contention] of course is that the [operator] has had and will have
possession of all of the proceeds from the production of the well and may
retain all of the proceeds until the drilling of the well and putting it on
production is entirely paid for."
In Huckabay v. The Texas Company,'" the defendant drilled a well
pursuant to a mineral lease granted by the owners of a mineral servitude
in and to an undivided seven-eighths (7/8) interest in the lands. The
plaintiffs owned the lands and the remaining one-eighth (1/8) interest in
the minerals. Plaintiffs asserted that the defendant "was in bad faith in
entering on the land and drilling the well." Thus, the plaintiffs argued
that they were "entitled to participate, according to their ownership, in
the production without being responsible for their share of the expenses."
The court rejected this contention, noting that
... on several occasions this Court has applied the equitable rule
that where one co-owner (or co-lessee) has explored and developed
a field without the concurrence or assistance of the other, the former
is bound to account to that other for his proportionate share of the
proceeds less a proportionate share of the expenses."
The court in Arkansas Fuel Oil Corporation v. Weber'45 relied on
Huckabay for the proposition that, "while the right of an owner to refrain
from exercising his right of ownership is absolute, he is nevertheless,
precluded from enjoyment of profits without participation in the
expenses incurred in the production of such profits."
In another case,14 it was said that, "[i]n the normal course of events
mere ownership in pooled or unitized lands or mineral interests therein
does not entitle the owners to share in drilling costs paid the operator by
other participants in the pool or unit. . . . Granted such proprietors

possess certain aspects of 'ownership'. Included are the right to each
participant's pro rata share of oil, gas and minerals produced. Coupled
with such right is the correlative obligation for a like percentage of
drilling and operating costs."
47
the court
In Willis v. International Oil and Gas Corporation,1
reviewed the Louisiana jurisprudence on this question and concluded, as
follows:
227 La. 191, 78 So.2d 829 (1955).
149 So.2d 101 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ denied 244 La. 205, 151 So.2d 493 (1963).
146 General Gas Corporationv. Continental Oil Company, 230 So.2d 906 (La.App. 1st
Cir. 1970).
147
541 So.2d 332 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1989).
14

145
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In summay, whether one is a co-owner who has not concurred or
assisted in the exploration and development of the property, or is the
owner of a separately owned tract of land embraced within a drilling
unit and has elected not to participate in the risk and expense of the
unit well, there is no entitlement to share in the proceeds from
production until the cost of drilling and operating the well is paid
for.
C. Right cf Lessor and Overriding Royalty Interest Owner to be
PaidRevenues Priorto "Payout."
A natural consequence of the fact that a non-participating owner is
not entitled to receive its proportionate share of production until
"payout," is that the party which drilled the well is entitled to receive all
production allocable to the unleased interest until "payout." During that
period of time, the non-participating party is nevertheless obligated to
pay its royalty obligations and, conversely, the producing party has no
obligation to pay such royalty obligations.
La. R.S. 30:1OA(2)(e) reads, as follows:
The provisions of Paragraph 2(b) above with respect to the risk
charge shall not apply to any unleased interest not subject to an oil,
gas, and mineral lease. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph
2(b) the royalty owner and overriding royalty owner shall receive
that portion of production due to them under the terms of the
contract cr:ating the royalty.
The seconc. sentence, as noted above, is in the active, not passive,
voice and, consequently, does not attempt to speak to the party
responsible to discharge the obligation to pay "the royalty owner and
overriding royalty owner."
A recent case, Gulf Explorer, LLC v. Clayton Williams Energy,
Inc.,'" considered this statute and addressed this issue. The defendant
was the operator of a compulsory unit and proposed to drill a unit well. It
gave notice of ius intention to drill a well to the plaintiff which owned a
mineral lease covering a tract of land in the unit.149
Because thc plaintiff did not respond to the operator's notice, it was
considered as having chosen to not participate.
The unit well was completed as a producer and the operator
withheld all proceeds attributable to the lands covered by the mineral
lease held by plaintiff. The unit well never achieved "payout."
The plaintiff released its mineral lease and thereafter sued the
operator, "seekirg a declaratory judgment stating that [plaintiff]'s royalty
Cited at footnote 116, supra.
The notice was issued pursuant to the Risk Fee Statute, La. R.S. 30:10A(2). See
Section 7.02 hereof, infra.
148
149

-
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and overriding royalty owners were entitled to their share of production
from [the unit] attributable to the duration of its leases."
The trial court rejected plaintiffs contention and held for the
defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court held that the operator "is entitled to recover its
costs out of the production attributable to [plaintiffj's tract or 'continuous
expanse of land' and not merely the amounts attributable to that tract
minus the royalties and overriding royalties [plaintiff] is obligated to pay
pursuant to its contract with third parties."
Noting further that Louisiana law' provides that "the royalty owner
and overriding royalty owner shall receive that portion of production due
to them under the terms of the contract creating the royalty," the court
stated, as follows:
Clayton Williams has no contractual relationship with Gulf's
lessors; under the facts presented herein, Clayton Williams has no
obligation to pay Gulf's royalty and overriding royalty owners
before it legally recoups its expenses from production pursuant to
LSA-R.S. 30:10A(2)(b)(i).
D. Right of Mineral Royalty Interest Owner to be Paid Revenues
Priorto "Payout."
If the unleased mineral interest is burdened by a mineral royalty
interest,"s' does the operator have any different obligations to pay
royalties to that mineral royalty interest owner prior to "payout"? The
answer is clearly, no.
Whatever might be the obligations of the mineral owner to the
owner of the mineral royalty interest which he has created, the fact
remains that, prior to "payout," the operator has a paramount right to
withhold the entirety of production allocable to the burdened tract until it
has recovered its costs.' 52
Said differently, the right of the operator to withhold proceeds of
production allocable to an unleased interest should not be diminished or
rendered ineffectual by reason of the fact that the mineral owner created
a mineral royalty interest.15 3
La. R.S. 30:1OA(2)(e).
"A mineral royalty is the right to participate in production of minerals from land
owned by another or land subject to a mineral servitude owned by another. Unless
expressly qualified by the parties, a royalty is a right to share in gross production free of
mining or drilling and production costs." Article 80, Louisiana Mineral Code.
ISO
151

See Gulf Explorer, LLC v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., cited at
footnote 116,
supra.
152

If the unleased mineral owner is not entitled to receive production, it is self-evident
that such an owner may not convey to a mineral royalty owner greater rights than he
153

himself has. Frost-JohnsonLumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207, 245
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Given the fact that it is receiving no revenue, does the mineral
royalty owner hEve a claim against the mineral owner who created the
mineral royalty? It is not clear under the law, but a case could be made
that such a cause of action exists.
By the very nature of the royalty grant, the mineral owner has
conferred upon 1he mineral royalty owner "the right to participate in
production," and such right is "free of mining or drilling and production
costs."' 54 A mineral royalty is purely passive."
One must note that this is not an issue of whether a duty to drill or
produce in the first instance is owed by the mineral owner to the royalty
owner. No such duty is owed."'
Article 109, Louisiana Mineral Code, provides:
The owner of an executive interest is not obligated to grant a
mineral lease, but in doing so, he must act in good faith and in the
same manne~r as a reasonably prudent landowner or mineral
servitude owner whose interest is not burdened by a nonexecutive
interest.
This basic right to refuse to lease' has been preserved in Article
109, which filrthr provides that, if the owner of the executive interest
does elect to lease, he must act in good faith with respect to the interest
of the nonexecutive interest owner.
The purpose of the language of Articles 109 and 110 is to overrule
Gardnerv. Boagri'i" and Uzee v. Bollinger'" insofar as these cases held
that the executive interest owner owes no duty whatsoever to the
nonexecutive interest owner.
The extent of the duty to act fairly is somewhat cloudy, but it is fair
to say that under the Code, the executive interest owner can no longer act
in total disregard of the rights of the nonexecutive interest owner.

(1922) (". . . no one :an convey to another any greater right than he himself has.");
Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Matherne, 476 So.2d 1037 (La.App. 3rd Cir.
1985) ("An assignee acquires no greater rights than its assignor.").
b4
Article 80, Loui iana Mineral Code.
1
"The owner of a mineral royalty has no executive rights; nor does he have the right
to conduct operations :o explore for or produce minerals." Article 81, Louisiana Mineral
Code.
156
Spiner v. Phillip Petroleum Co., 94 F.Supp. 273 (W.D. La. 1950).
157
See Willis v. Irternational Oil and Gas Corporation, cited and discussed at
footnotes 50 and 147, zupra.
158
252 La. 30, 209 ;o.2d 11 (1968).
'"
178 So.2d 508 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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Be that as it may, here, there is production in fact and the royalty
owner is being denied its right to participate; it is being denied the
essential benefit of its bargain.
,.
The royalty grant, unless qualified, would carry an implied warranty
of delivery to the mineral royalty owner, and it should have a basis to
complain if it is denied its right to participate in production because of
actions or inactions of its grantor. 60
3.07 Well Cost Reporting Statute - La. R.S. 30:103.1, et seq.:
A. General.
Obviously, a tremendous imbalance exists between an unleased
mineral owner and a major oil company which drills and operates a well
on lands within a unit with which the unleased property has been
unitized. Clearly, if the operator is entitled to withhold all proceeds of
production until "payout" is achieved, the unleased mineral owner is "at
the mercy" of the major oil company (with its technical staff of land
men, accountants, geologists, engineers and other personnel) in terms of
ascertaining precisely when "payout" is achieved.
It is in response to this imbalance that the Louisiana Legislature
adopted the Louisiana Well Cost Reporting Statute.'6 1
In summary, the operator is obligated to provide certain specified
information to the owner of the unleased interest, such information to be
"sworn, detailed and itemized." The report shall be provided to "each
owner of an unleased oil and gas interest who has requested such reports
in writing, by certified mail addressed to the operator or producer." "The
written request shall contain the unleased interest owner's name and
address." This requirement to furnish the name and address of the
owner of the unleased interest, would relieve the operator of the burden
to determine such information.
The information which must be produced is described in La. R.S.
30:103.1A, as follows:
(1) Within ninety calendar days from completion of the well, an
initial report which shall contain the costs of drilling, completing,
and equipping the unit well.

"The seller is bound to deliver the thing sold and to warrant to the buyer ownership
and peaceful possession of, and the absence of hidden defects in, that thing. The peller
also warrants that the thing sold is fit for its intended use." Article 2475, Louisiana
Revised Civil Code.
161
Act No. 387 of the 1950 Louisiana Legislature, now codified as La. R.S. 30:103.1,
et seq. The Louisiana Well Cost Reporting Statute was comprehensively amended by Act
No. 973 of the 2001 Louisiana Legislature.
162
La. R.S. 30:103.1B.
160
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(2) After establishment of production from the unit well, quarterly
reports which shall contain the following:
(a) The total amount of oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons produced
from the lands during the previous quarter.
(b) The price received from any purchaser of unit production.
(c) Quarterly operating costs and expenses.
(d) Any additional funds expended to enhance or restore the
production of the unit well.
"Whenever the operator or producer permits ninety calendar days to
elapse from completion of the well and thirty additional calendar days to
elapse from date of receipt of written notice by certified mail from the
owner or owners of unleased oil and gas interests calling attention to
failure to comply with the provisions of R.S. 30:103.1, such operator or
producer shall forfeit his right to demand contribution from the owner or
owners of the unleased oil and gas interests for the costs of the drilling
operations of the well."'
As seen, the operator's duty to provide the specified well cost
information to the unleased mineral owner is self-operative and
mandatory, and applies regardless of whether the owner has requested
the information. H4 If the operator has not complied with its statutory
duty, the unleased mineral owner should give written notice (dispatched
by certified, not registered, mail)165 to the operator, "calling attention to
[operator's] failure to comply with the provisions of R.S. 30:103.1," and
only should the operator fail to provide the requisite information within
thirty days of receipt, will the operator "forfeit his right to demand
contribution from the owner or owners of the unleased oil and gas
interests for the costs of the drilling operations of the well."
To be noted i:; the fact that, while operator is entitled to recover, out
of production, the unleased mineral owner's allocated share of the "costs
of drilling, completing, and equipping the unit well," and while such
information must be reported by the operator in response to a proper
request under the Well Cost Reporting Statute, still, if the operator fails
16)

La. R.S. 30:103.1.

'&I

La. R.S. 30:103.1 A .... said operator or producer shall issue
..

16:; Among other thi:igs, Act No. 973 of the 2001 Louisiana
Legislature changed the
statutory requirement that the notice and response be dispatched by registered mail to
certified mail. Because practicing oil and gas lawyers (including your author) so
forcefully advised clients (pre-2001) to respond by registered mail, it is feared that an
ancient client will picl< up a pre-2001 letter of advice (accurate at the time) and, post2001, comply to a request for well cost information by dispatching via registered mail
(no longer proper). Because the purpose is to create documentary evidence of proof of
mailing and receipt, the Legislature would have been better advised to provide for
dispatch by either certified or registered mail.
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to timely or properly respond, it (only) forfeits its right to "demand
contribution from the owner or owners of the unleased oil and gas
interests for the costs of the drilling operations of the well." Seemingly,
it does not forfeit its right to recover costs associated with the completing
and equipping of the unit well.
It is the experience of your author that, even if they provide a sworn
affidavit which "itemizes" costs, operators frequently fail to adequately
"detail" such costs. Because of the extreme consequences to the operator
for failure to timely or properly respond to a proper request for well
costs, care should be taken to ensure that the information provided is
sufficiently "detailed."
The statute further provides that no "operator or producer shall be
required under the provisions of this Section to report any information
which is not known by such operator or producer at the time of a report.
However, the operator or producer shall report the required information
to the owner of the unleased interest within thirty days after such
information is obtained by the operator or producer, or in the next
quarterly report, whichever due date is later."' 66 This limitation on
responsibility is very helpful where the producing well was not drilled by
the current operator, but, rather, by an ancient owner, many years
previous.
B. Applicability to a Tract Which is Leased to a Party Other Than
the Unit Operator.
In Genmar Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Storm,'6 ' a well produced on a "lease
basis" for a period of time prior to unitization. At a later date, a unit was
formed which included a tract of land leased to Genmar. A cost summary
was forwarded by Storm, the operator, to Genmar, who owned a mineral
lease in the (later formed) unit. The court stated that the statute "creates a
hardship on those persons who drill on leased property that is not within
a unit at the time of completion of a well." The court held that "90 days
after unitization is a reasonable time for a person who drills on leased
property, that is not within a unit at the time of completion of the well, to
submit to the owners of interests, a sworn, detailed, itemized statement,
the cost of the drilling."
The Genmar Court did not give any consideration to the issue of
whether the statute should even apply to a mineral lessee as distinguished
from an unleased mineral owner. By its terms, the statute seems to only
be applicable to the "owner of an unleased oil or gas interest."

La. R.S. 30:103.1B.
297 So.2d 722 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ granted 302 So.2d 13 (La. 1974), cause
dismissed 309 So.2d 657 (La. 1975).
166

167
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Under the Louisiana Constitutions of both 1921 and 1974, a
legislative bill :;ubmitted for adoption must have a title which indicates
its object.'" The title to the legislation which adopted the Well Cost
Reporting Statute. provides that it involves "the obligations of
operators and producers of Oil and Gas to owners of unleased Oil and
Gas interests ard for penalty for non-performance of requirements."
Because no reference is made in the title to a tract of land which is
leased to someone other than the operator (as opposed to being purely
unleased), a constitutional argument could be made that the statute
cannot be applied to a tract subject to a mineral lease held by a party
other than the operator. A tract leased to a party other than the operator is
clearly not an "unleased" oil and gas interest.
C. Jurisprndence.
In earliest reported decision under the statute,7 o written notice of
non-compliance was directed to operator, but did not clearly show that
plaintiff was recuesting a statement of costs and did not point out that the
operator had failed to comply with the statute. The court held that the
statute is a pena. statute and, thus, it must be strictly construed.
But, "strict construction" in whose favor - the operator or the party
desiring well cost information?
The court in Scurlock Oil Company v. Getty Oil Company"' stated
that the Well Cost Reporting Statute, being penal, "should be construed
strictly against the party seeking to impose the penalty."l72 There, the
statute was held to not apply where proceeds of unit production were
being placed into the registry of the court pending determination of
validity of leases.
Rivers v. Stun Oil Company"' is the only reported decision in which
the statute was enforced. A demand letter was sent on September 28,
1978, but there was no response until August 16, 1979. The statute was
See Article III, Section 16, of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution ("Every statute
enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative
of its object") and Article III, Section 15, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution ("Every bill
shall contain a brief title indicative of its object").
169
Act No. 387 o:'the 1950 Louisiana Legislature.
17
White v. Phil'ips Petroleum Company, 232 So.2d 83 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ
refused 255 La. 907, 233 So.2d 560 (1970).
171
324 So.2d 870, 877 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1976).
172
See also Albe -'.Albe, 97-1042 (La.App. 4th Cir. 11/19/97); 703 So.2d 756 ("Strict
construction of a penal statute requires that it be interpreted AGAINST imposition of
penalty . . . ."). But see Genmar Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Storm, 297 So.2d 722 (La.App. 4th
Cir. 1974) in which the dissenting judge apparently felt that it should be strictly construed
against the operator.
17
503 So.2d 1036 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ denied 505 So.2d 58 (La. 1987).
168
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applied and judgment was rendered against operator "for any drilling
costs retained by" operator.
4 the landowner dispatched
In Browning v. Exxon Corporation,"'
notice by certified, rather than registered, mail."' The court held that
dispatch in such a manner did not constitute effective notice under the
statute. Since a penal statute is strictly construed, the failure of the sender
to comply with the literal requirements of the statute does not result in
the forfeiture by the operator of the right to enforce contribution or
recoupment. 176
"It is well settled that if the intent of the legislature is clear from the
language it employs, that is the end of the inquiry: a court must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of the legislature if its
application does not lead to absurd consequences." 7 7
3.08 Inapplicability of Louisiana Mineral Code Remedies Relative to
Double Royalties as Damages, Interest, Attorney's Fees and Privilege
for Unpaid Rent
A. Preface.
The Louisiana Mineral Code provides significant remedies to a
lessor whose mineral lessee has not properly paid royalties owed under
the mineral lease. 17 8 Because these remedies accrue to the-unpaid lessor
under a mineral lease, the unleased mineral owner does not have access
to such remedies. Any contention to the contrary would be unavailing as
the following analysis demonstrates.
B. Double Royalties as Damages.
Clearly the provisions of Articles 137 through 141 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code have no application to the unleased mineral owner as they
only apply to the lessor-lessee relationship. These articles are prefaced
with the predicate that they apply when "a mineral lessor seeks relief for
the failure of his lessee to make timely or proper payment of royalties."
Additionally, the term "royalty" is defined in Article 213(5) of the
848 F.Supp. 1241 (M.D. La.), affd 43 F.3d 668 (Sth Cir. 1994).
175
The facts presented in this case arose before the amendment in 2001 of the
Louisiana Well Cost Reporting Statute. That amendment, inter alia, changed the
requirement that the notice and response be sent by "registered" mail to "certified" mail.
See discussion in footnote 165, supra.
176
"Forfeiture is a harsh remedy. Thus, statutory forfeiture must be strictly construed."
Wise v. J. E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 97-0684 (La. 1/21/98); 707 So.2d 1214, 1;18.
"However, the fact that forfeitures are not favored in our law does not mean that ...
provisions calling for forfeitures are to be ignored." Bender v. Louisiana & Arkansas
Railway Company, 255 So.2d 849, 851 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1972).
17
Huszar v. TangipahoaParish School Board, 95-2594 (La.App. Ist Cir. 9/27/96);
681 So.2d 60, 62.
1'
Articles 137 through 141, Louisiana Mineral Code.
"
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Louisiana Mineral Code as being "used in connection with mineral
leases." Finally, these articles appear in Chapter 7 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code which regulate the "mineral lease."
Consideration should be given to the possible application of Article
212.21 of the Louisiana Mineral Code which reads, as follows:
If the owner of a mineral production payment or a royalty owner
other than a mineral lessor seeks relief for the failure of a mineral
lessee to make timely or proper payment of royalties or the
productior. payment, he must give his obligor written notice of such
failure as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages.
Articles which follow this article set forth a similar procedure and
remedy as exist in the lessor-lessee relationship.
Article 212.21 has no application to the unleased mineral owner
since such own -r does not possess or own a "production payment" and it
is not a "royalty owner."
A "production payment" as contemplated by Article 212.21 is an
interest created by the owner of a working interest in a mineral lease.
This is illustrated by Article 171 of the Louisiana Mineral Code which
reads, as follows:
A co-owner of the lessee's interest in a mineral lease may create a
dependent right such as an overriding royalty, production payment,
net profits interest, or other non-operating interest out of his
undivided interest without the consent of his co-owner. He may also
transfer all or part of his undivided interest.
"Production payment" was defined in Carr Staley, Inc. v. United
States ofAnerica,' 7 as follows:
A fundamcntal characteristic of a production payment is that it is
not burdened with any of the operating expenses of a lease. It is
payable only out of production, and there is no personal liability on
the part of the owner of the production payment. The production
payment owner has no possessory interest, no right to drill, no right
to the surfhce, and no claim to possession. . . . His interest is an

incorporeal hereditament in the nature of an overriding royalty
creating a present interest in land in the payee.
Clearly, a "production payment" envisions a contractual
arrangement created by a working interest owner. Such is clearly not the
nature of the interest of an unleased mineral owner.
By analogy, the Louisiana Mineral Code articles have no
application to production revenues that are owed to working interest

17

496 F.2d 1366, 1367 (5th Cir. 1974).
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owners. Indeed, in the only decision on point, so the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reached this very conclusion:
Pennzoil in its counterclaim has asked for double damages and
attorney's fees on its working and royalty interest claims against
LL&E. LL&E in resisting these demands has sought summary
judgment in their favor on this issue. Their basis for this request is
La. R.S. 31:212.21 et seq. (West Supp. 1994). These statutes
indicate that damages and attorney'sfees are applicableonly where
there is a non-payment ofproduction payments or royalties, but not
working interests. Pennzoil concedes that its claim for damages and
attorney's fees fails to attach to its working interest, but reserves its
right to establish at trial its entitlement to damages and attorney's
fees relating to its overriding royalty interest. Consequently,
LL&E's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to
Pennzoil's request for double damages and attorney's fees relating
to non-payment of its working interest and denied with respect to
Pennzoil's submission for double damages and attorney's fees with
respect to non-payment of its royalty interest. Pennzoil may reserve
its claim with respect to the overriding royalty interest. (Emphasis
added).
C. Interest.
Upon achievement of "payout," with the result that the unleased
mineral owner is, from the date of "payout," entitled to receive its
proportionate share of unit production (subject to the obligation to bear
its proportionate part of unit operating costs), the question is presented as
to whether the operator is obligated to pay interest on the monies owed to
the unleased mineral owner and, if so, from what date is interest to
accrue?
The issue was presented in Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Company."'
On appeal, the defendant complained about the judgment ordering it to
"account for production accrued after suit was filed with interest." The
court stated that "the trial judge was correct in decreeing legal interest
was due from the date of judicial demand' until paid on all sums due
petitioner."

Iso

Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration and Production Co.,
962 F.Supp. 908, 922 (E.D. La. 1997).
181 298 So.2d 897 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied 302 So.2d 3 (La. 1974).
182
The date of "judicial demand" is the date on which a lawsIt is filed. "A civil action
is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right. It is comm nced by the filing of a
pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction." Article 421 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure (last sentence omitted). See also Abraham v.
Abraham, 233 La. 808, 98 So.2d 197 (1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/7
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D. Attorney's Fees.
The well established rule in Louisiana is that one may not recover
attorney's fees from a defendant unless such fees are authorized by
contract or statute.'" By definition, there is no contract between the
unleased mineral owner and the operator and, hence, if the unleased
mineral owner is entitled to attorney's fees, such must be imposed by
statute.
Louisiana law has long characterized an award of attorney's fees as
being penal in nature.' As such, the court must strictly construe the
statute or contract allegedly forming the basis for this penal award, and
grant same only in cases which are clear and free from doubt.'
Thus, for the same reason that an unleased mineral owner cannot
invoke the provisions of the Louisiana Mineral Code relative to double
royalties or interest, attorney's fees are also unavailable to the unleased
mineral owner.
E. Privilegefor UnpaidRent.
Article 146 of the Louisiana Mineral Code instructs that the "lessor
of a mineral lease has, for the payment of his rent,'16 and other
obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on all equipment, machinery,
and other property of the lessee on or attached to the property leased."
Clearly, by its express terms, the right of pledge only avails the
"lessor of a mineral lease," thereby clearly excluding the unleased
mineral owner. "Liens and privileges are to be strictly construed against
1
Chauvin v. La Hitte, 229 La. 94, 85 So.2d 43 (1956) ("On numerous occasions this
court has said that ordinarily attorney's fees are not assessable as an item of damages
unless provided for by law or contract.") and Hernandez v. Harson, 237 La. 389, 111
So.2d 320 (1955) ("It is well recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court that as a
general rule attorney's fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or
contract.").
184
Langley v. Petro Star Corp. of La., 2001-0198 (La. 6/29/01); 792 So.2d 721, 723
("An award of atorney fee is a type of penalty imposed not to make the injured party
whole, but rather to discourage a particular activity on the part of the opposing party.").
185
Cracco v. Barras, 520 So.2d 371, 372 (La. 1988); Finley v. Safeco Insurance
Company, 511 Sa.2d 457, 461 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1987); Moore Romero & Co. v. Nan
Corp., 458 So.2d 675, 679 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1984); Braswell v. Morris, 275 So.2d 189,
194 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1973); LouisianaPower & Light Company v. Crescent Properties
Company, Inc., 273 So.2d 48, 50 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973); Dubroc v. W. T. Grant, 591
F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Third and most important, we are mindful that in
Louisiana the 'imposition of attorney's fees is penal in nature, is not favored and should
not be imposed except in cases which are clear and free from doubt.').
186
Article 123, Louisiana Mineral Code, indicates that "[p]ayments to the lessor for
the maintenance of a mineral lease without drilling or mining operations or production or
for the maintenaice of a lease during the presence on the lease or any land unitized
therewith of a well capable of production in paying quantities, and royalties paid to the
lessor on product on are rent." Thus, even the definition of "rent" is indicative of the fact
that the right of p edge is available only to a mineral lessor.
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claimants and liberally construed in favor of owners as they are in
derogation of the common rights of owners.""'
IV. Rights of (Former) Lessee
Subsequent to Release of Mineral Lease
4.01 Right to Remove Surface Equipment and Subsurface Casing
and Tubing:
A. Time Period Within Which Lessee May Remove its Equipment.
Unless restricted by contract, a lessee may remove its equipment,
both surface and subsurface, during the term of the lease and for a
reasonable time thereafter. In the absence of a clause addressing this
issue, Louisiana law recognizes this right, as noted in Section 4.01D,
infra.
In Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Barlow,' the lessee drilled a
dry hole. About eight months later, the lessee went onto the property to
remove the pipe which had been left in the ground. The lessor prevented
the lessee's representatives from removing the equipment. The lessee
enjoined the lessor from interfering with its removal of the equipment.
The court noted that the lease contract "conferred upon the lessee 'the
right to remove all machinery, fixtures, and improvements placed [on the
leased premises] at any time."' The court stated, as follows:
The learned trial judge says in his well-considered opinion:
'It is incredible that any oil company should intend to present to a
lessor $1,400.00 worth of pipe, after it had expended $10,000 or
more in drilling a well into salt water.'
And so it appears to us. No doubt, if the lessor (sic - lessee) defers
the removal of his pipe for so long a time as to authorize the belief
that he has abandoned it, a court would so hold, but counsel for
plaintiff quote "Thornton" and "Archer" to the effect that the lessor
(sic - lessee) is entitled to a reasonable time after the expiration of
his lease within which to take such action [citation omitted], and we
approve that doctrine.
The court in Bickham v. Bussa Oil & Gas Co., Inc.189 stated, as
follows:
There is a vast difference between an abandonment of the lease and
an abandonment of the personal property belonging to the lessee
and their assigns. The lease could, of course, be abandoned and title
to the personal property remain in the lessee.
Louisiana Nat'l Bank ofBaton Rouge v. Triple R Contractors, Inc., 345 So.2d 7, 10
(La. 1977).
188
141 La. 52, 74 So. 627 (1917).
187

189

152 So. 393 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1934).
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To constitute an abandonment of personal property so as to give a
third pary the right to assume title and control of it, two essential
elements must exist. There must be an act of abandonment coupled
with the intention to abandon.
The court found that three months' delay in removing personal property
from the leased premises was not unreasonable, where the lease
permitted removal "at any time."
Where the lease grants the lessee the right to remove equipment
from the leased premises "at any time," the courts, relying on Standard
Oil, have inteipreted this to mean "within a reasonable time."O
As to what constitutes a "reasonable period of time" within which
the lessee might remove its equipment, the determination will vary
according to the circumstances. One commentator cites cases from other
jurisdictions ranging from eighteen months and less as reasonable and
three years end more as unreasonable.9' "Exactly where, between
eighteen monihs and three years, the dividing line will be found, cannot
be stated. It may be that some courts, under some circumstances, will
state that three years is reasonable, while other courts, under different
circumstances, may say that eighteen months is unreasonable. However,
it is probably safer to consider eighteen months as the upper limits of
reasonability."' 9 2
The leading commentators on oil and gas law have noted,'" as
follows:
The question of what is a 'reasonable time' is a difficult one. A
leading case has declared that a surface owner asserting title to
casing and fixtures by reason of the elapsing of a reasonable time
after termination of the lease must allege and prove what would be a
reasonable time under the circumstances of the case.
That which constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact or, at
least, a nixed question of law and fact and depends upon the
circumstances surrounding the case to which the principle is sought
to be applied. What would be'a reasonable time in one case might be
wholly inadequate to shut off the rights of parties in a different case
or under different circumstances. [Quote from Meers v. Frick-Reid
Supply Corp., 127 S.W. 2d 493 at 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)
omitted].

Donnell v. Gray, 215 La. 497, 41 So.2d 66 (1949).
Moses, The Right of a Lessee Under an Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease to Remove
Casing From an Abandoned Well, 19 Tul. L.Rev. 229 (1944-5).
'"
191

'92

Id. at 234.

19

Williams and Meyers, 4 Oil and Gas Law § 674. 1.
Ill -
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In order to illustrate the uncertainty as to what is a "reasonable
time," the authors cite cases from various jurisdictions holding that
periods of time from eight months to nine years was not an unreasonable
period of time as a matter of law while noting that other "cases have
found lapsation of a reasonable time after 14 1/2 months, several years,
four years and 5 1/2 years." These references certainly indicate that each
case turns on its own individual facts.
B. Consequences ofFailureto Remove Within Reasonable Time.
But what happens if the lessee fails to remove its equipment within
a reasonable period of time? Although there is no Louisiana case directly
on point, a court would follow the prevailing rule as recognized by the
Commentators, 94 as follows.
If the lessee fails to remove casing, fixtures and other equipment on
the premises within a reasonable time, the lessee's title to such
material is ended and title vests in the surface owner.
C. Regulatory Implications.
Difficult problems can obviously arise where an operator has completed a well as a dry hole and fails to pay certain subcontractors for
services rendered or suppliers for material furnished to the well. While
those subcontractors or suppliers may have lien rights under the Oil, Gas
and Water Well Lien Statute,"s a problem arises when the operator's
equipment has not been removed within a "reasonable period of time"
and such equipment would, absent such liens, revert to the lessor. As
noted in Section 3.08E hereof, even in the absence of liens in favor of a
subcontractor or supplier, the lessor "has, for the payment of his rent, and
other obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on all equipment,
machinery, and other property of the lessee on or attached to the property
leased" under Article 146, Louisiana Mineral Code.
A further complication is that the operator has the duty to plug and
abandon the well under Section XIX of Statewide Order No. 29-B
promulgated by the Commissioner of Conservation.'" In order to
reconcile some of these competing interests, the lien statute now
provides that the "lien and privilege provided for in this Subpart shall not
attach or apply to any rigs, machinery, appurtenances, appliances,
equipment, or other related equipment moved onto the lease for the
purpose of plugging and abandoning the well or wells and closing
associated pits thereon in compliance with an order issued by the

'9

19s
'96

Id., at§ 674.2.
La. R.S. 9:4861, et seq.
See LAC 43:XIX.137.
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commissioner of conservation after public hearing in accordance with the
provisions of R.S. 30:1 et seq."'
D. Codal Treatment ofthe Issue.
The Louisiana Mineral Code does not contain any provision dealing
with the right of a lessee to remove casing or other equipment. Under
Article 2, Louisiana Mineral Code, it is stated that, "[i]f this Code does
not expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the Civil
Code or other laws are applicable."' 9 8
Under the Louisiana Revised Civil Code, the matter would be
addressed by Article 2695 (discussed in Section 6.04 hereof), if the lease
contract is silent on the subject of the right or duty of the lessee to
remove equipment after the lease terminates.
V. Obligations of (Former) Lessee
Subsequent to Release of Mineral Lease
5.01 Continuing Responsibility for Accrued Obligations:
Clearly, a lessee - while having the lessor's contractual permission
to release the lease, in whole or in part - cannot thereby avoid, or "wash
its hands of," obligations which have already been incurred.'"
The notion that an obligor (the lessee) cannot unburden himself of
liabilities which have accrued to or in favor of the obligee (the lessor) is
not at all radic-al. It is, in fact, consistent with a similar rule, now
expressed in Article 129 of the Mineral Code, that an "assignor or
sublessor is noi relieved of his obligations or liabilities under a mineral
lease unless the lessor has discharged him expressly and in writing.'?"
An issue might arise as to when an obligation is deemed to have
"accrued" for purposes of this rule. Your author is aware of litigation
wherein it is contended that a plugging and abandonment obligation had
"accrued" at the time of an assignment of a producing lease with the
contended result that, unless released, the assignor remains liable for
such obligation, even though no P&A operations had yet taken place.
An example of when an obligation is deemed to have "accrued," for
regulatory purposes, is set forth in the regulations of the Minerals
Originally, La. R.S. 9:4861.2C was enacted by Act No. 1065 of the 1990 Louisiana
197
Legislature. See no v La. R.S. 9:4863D.
198
This article was applied in Taussig v. GoldKing Properties Co., cited at footnote
87, supra, where the court resorted to the Louisiana Revised Civil Code to resolve a
problem not addressed in the Louisiana Mineral Code, viz., "the Civil Code['s] general
treatment of abandonment."
199 As stated by one distinguished Commentator, "a wise lessor will insist that the
surrender clause be modified so as expressly to forbid the avoidance of accrued liability
by its exercise." M'.rrill, The Oil and Gas Lease - Major Problems, 41 Neb. L.Rev. 488
at 513 (1962).
200
See Kleas v. Iayfield, 404 So.2d 500 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1981).
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Management Service where it is provided that the "obligations to plug
and abandon wells, remove platforms and other facilities, and to clear the
seafloor of obstructions accrue when a well is drilled or used, a platform
or other facility is installed or used, or an obstruction is created."20'
The court in Shanks I noted that "[e]xecution of the release pursuant
to this ["surrender clause"] prospectively relieved the lessee of all
obligations as to the land released."202 (Emphasis in original).
In Shanks II,203 the plaintiffs continued to posit the notion that a
release of the mineral lease would not absolve Carden, the original
lessee, of its obligation to pay well costs. As in Shanks I, the court
rejected this contention, as follows:
As stated in Shanks [f], and as acknowledged by plaintiffs in brief,
through Exchange's exercise of the right to release the interests in
the leases at issue, plaintiffs became unleased landowners of a onehalf interest in their tracts. This release entitled them to eighteighths of production, but also obligated them to pay any
prospectively accruing well costs that became chargeable from their
proportionate share as the well continued to produce. See Shanks
[I], 674 So.2d at 478. The position taken by plaintiffs would require
post termination enforcement of the released leases as to the former
lessee's (Carden's) responsibility for drilling costs, but would treat
as released or terminated the former lessee's (Carden's) contractual
right to seven-eighths of production, a proposition previously
described by the United States District Court as "Heads-I win-Tailsyou lose." See Browning v. Exxon Corporation,848 F.Supp. 1241,
1247 (U.S.D.C. M.D.La.), aff'd, '43 F.3d 668 (5th Cir.1994).
Clearly, this position cannot prevail.
In Anderson v. Tenneco Oil Company,20 it was held that the
"surrender clause" in the State mineral lease meant that, "once the lease
was terminated, all obligations associated with said lease also
terminated." Consequently, the court held that the lessee was absolved of

MMS NTL No. 93-2N dated October 6, 1993. A comparable rule exists in the
policies of the Louisiana Office of Conservation. See Enforcement Policy - Abandoned
Wells & Pits, Memorandum by J. Patrick Batchelor, Commissioner of Conservation,
dated July 24, 1990, providing that a prior operator may be responsible for remediation
after a determination that "the operator of record no longer exists (bankruptcy, etc.)." If
the operator of record no longer exists, the Office of Conservation "will pursue a line of
succession from [the] current operator of record down to [the] original generator" to
determine responsibility for remediation.
202
Cited at footnote 105, supra, at 478.
203
Cited at footnote 107, supra.
204
2001-0295, 2001-0296 (La.App. 4th Cir. 5/22/02); 826 So.2d 1143, writ denied
2002-2035 (La. I1/1/02); 828 So.2d 585.
201
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liability for certain pilings and that the "State assumed full responsibility
for the land and anything attached thereto."205
VI. Rights of Unleased Mineral Owner
6.01 Marketing of Unit Gas Production:
A. Preface.
In the early to mid-1980s, the "hot topic" of the day was gas
marketing and the right of a non-operating party to insist that the
operator sell its share of gas for it, or, stated in the converse, whether an
operator could be forced to share its market. Known as the "take-or-pay"
days, this circumstance was driven, in large part, by a surplus of natural
gas on the market and the consequential effort by gas purchasers to
reduce 'their contractual obligations to take gas at a time when supply
surpassed demand.
The following facts in the lead case of the day set up this situation.
Amoco was the operator of certain compulsory units in the
Morganza Fields. Amoco entered into a gas sales contract with Columbia
Gas Transmission Corporation. Certain working interest owners elected
to take their share of natural gas "in kind" and proceeded to separately
market their gas. Other working interest owners, however, did not
separately market, but, rather, allowed Amoco to sell their gas under the
Columbia contract. The court (to be discussed below) then described the
following "factual setting [which] has caused the present dispute," towit:
In 1982, a national gas surplus developed, and the price of gas
dropped. Columbia advised Amoco that it would no longer accept
delivery of the nonmarketing owners' share of the gas produced
from the Field. Amoco notified the nonmarketing owners of this
fact. Thereafter, Amoco delivered to Columbia and to the
purchasers of the other marketing owners all of the production from
the units. However, when Columbia terminated its agreement to buy
the gas of the nonmarketing owners, they were left without a
purchaser in a depressed market.
B. BrieffHistory of Commissioner's Orders Relative to Marketing.

Against this backdrop, Amoco applied to the Commissioner of
Conservation "for an order which would allow it to separately market its
share of production from the Field and balance (give in kind at a later
date) the share cf the nonmarketing owners. A public hearing was held
and, on March 9, 1984, Commissioner Martin issued Order Nos. 1102
and 1102-A wherein he found:
(i) That there were owners who did not have markets for their gas;

205

Id. at 1149.
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(ii) That any owner who did not have a market would not be able
to receive his just and equitable share of gas from the unit wells;
(iii) That any owner who was not a signatory to a balancing
agreement could elect one of two options * To assume full responsibility for marketing his share of
production by either separately marketing or be deemed to be
forced balanced;
* To authorize the unit operator to sell his share of
production for two years from the date of the Order and to
account to him for the proceeds received from this separate
sale, with the operator to market the gas in good faith on terms
that are fair and reasonable and which reflect the market value
of the gas at the time of the contract.
On March 12, 1984, Commissioner Martin was replaced by
Commissioner Thompson. Commissioner Thompson granted a rehearing
of Commissioner Martin's Order and, on September 9, 1984, issued an
Order rescinding Commissioner Martin's Order effective its date of
issuance. Commissioner Thompson also ordered:
(i) The operator to "deliver to each owner, absent an agreement
between affected owners to take in kind, his just and equitable share
of the proceeds of production after repayment of any costs that may
be due";
(ii) That, in the absence of an agreement to take in kind, Amoco
and the non-marketing owners "shall be deemed to have contracted
for the operator to market all the common supply of gas"; Amoco
shall account to itself and the nonmarketing owners on a pro rata
basis for all such sales, and this "election contracted for shall
continue until the operator and the non-marketing owners may
mutually agree otherwise, or unit depletion."
Commissioner Thompson clearly embraced the "molecular theory"
of ownership, that is, that each mineral owner in a compulsory unit is an
owner in indivision of each molecule of gas produced.
C. Judicial Review of Commissioner's Orders Relative to
Marketing.
On Amoco's application for judicial review of Commissioner
Thompson's Order, the trial court held:
(i) That Commissioner Thompson correctly embraced the
"molecular theory";
(ii) That the Commissioner had jurisdiction over marketing issues
in order to provide for the orderly development, production and
utilization of the state's mineral resources and to prevent waste;

-116https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/7
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(iii) That Commissioner Thompson's Order did not set forth any
basis for accounting to non-marketing owners;
(iv) That Ccmmissioner Thompson's Order did not provide for an
accounting to all marketing, non-operating owners;
(v) That Commissioner Thompson's Order did not provide for a
reasonable election period for non-marketing owners.
The trial court renanded the case to the Commissioner to (a) specify the
basis on which Amoco would account to the non-marketing owners; (b)
determine if the marketing, non-operating owners had to account to the
non-marketing owners on the same basis as Amoco, and (c) provide for a
reasonable period of time for the non-marketing owners to make the
required election.
D. Back to the Commissioner.
On remand, Commissioner Thompson issued an Order dated March
4, 1986, which provided:
(i) That Amoco was required to account to the non-marketing
owners on thc: basis of "each non-marketing owner(s) tract's pro rata
share of the proceeds realized at the time of sale," which was
defined as "the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller of
gas in an arm's length transaction under contracts negotiated for the
purchase and sale of production of like kind at the time the gas is
marketed";
(ii) That marketing, non-operating owners were required to
account to non-marketing owners on the same basis as Amoco; and
(iii) That non-marketing owners
* for past production from existing units (production prior to
the effective date of the Commissioner's Order) were "deemed
to have elected to participate in the cost of drilling and
completing the well and to have the unit operator and the
marketing non-operator(s) . . . market his share of the gas";
* for future production from existing units were given a
period of thirty (30) days (from the effective date of the Order)
to elect to take their gas in kind or have Amoco market their
share of production; provided that, if a non-marketing owner
failed to elect, he "shall be deemed" to have elected "to have
his gas marketed exclusively by the unit operator," and, further
provided that, if a non-marketing owner elected to take his gas
in kind, the Commission would hold a hearing to determine if
he could "do so without waste resulting"; and
* for future production from future units were given thirty
(30) days from the date of the Order creating the unit to elect to
take in kind or have the unit operator market their share of
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008
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production; provided that, if they elected to take in kind, the
Commissioner would hold a hearing to determine if the taking
in kind would result in waste. The. Order further provided that,
for future production from existing and future units where the
Commissioner prohibited a non-marketing owner from taking
in kind, the unit operator would proceed with the marketing of
all gas produced not subject to a marketing agreement and
account on the basis previously set forth.
The non-marketing owners asked for a clarification as to the basis
on which the accountings were to be made. By Supplemental Reasons
dated March 13, 1986, the Commissioner stated that, "in most
circumstances the accounting due should be based on the proceeds
received for the gas." However, the Commissioner further observed that
no owner "should enrich himself vis-a-vis a nonmarketing owner simply
by taking the position that his portion of the gas is entitled to a higher
price because the market price has fallen" and that no non-marketing
owner "should enrich himself vis-a-vis a marketing owner simply by
taking the position that his portion of the gas is entitled to a higher than
contract price because the market price has risen."
E. Back to Court.
In Amoco Production Company v. Thompson,206 the Court of
Appeal, First Circuit, held that the Commissioner "committed legal error
when he held that he did not have the power to partition co-owned gas
produced from a compulsory unit, [and when he held that] the gas
produced from the various units had not been partitioned by the orders
establishing the compulsory units, and [and when he held that] he did not
have the power to order balancing."
Accordingly, since, in the view of the court, the Commissioner's
Order was based upon erroneous legal principles, it remanded the case to
the Commissioner "for reconsideration pursuant to the views expressed
herein." The court specifically stated that "partition in kind is preferred
in the Conservation Law." The court further held that the Commissioner
could issue "an appropriate amending order" (which may require a cash
accounting) if on remand he finds as fact that the method of partition
(taking in kind) authorized in the initial Orders will (a) cause waste; (b)
adversely affect the right of a co-owner to take his just and equitable
share of production in kind, and/or (c) adversely affect the correlative
rights of a co-owner.
F. Back to the Commissioner,Again.
In compliance with the Court of Appeal's Judgment in the Amoco
case, the Commissioner held a hearing on September 26, 1988, to
206

516 So.2d 376 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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consider evidence relative to the issuance of an Order pertaining to a
determination o-: "the manner and procedure for partitioning unit
production from the units in the Morganza Field."
On December 14, 1988, Commissioner Batchelor issued
Supplement to Office of Conservation Order Nos. 1102, 1102-A, 1102A-1, 1102-A-2, 1102-A-3 and 1102-A-4, effective September 26, 1988.
The Commissioner found that "the combination of industry custom of
marketing the non-taking owners' shares by the unit operator, the
industry custom of charging expenses and crediting liquids on the
entitlement basis for all owners, including non-taking owners, together
with the sequence of events and marketing facts here present, disclose
that the non-taking owners did not have a viable market during the
critical period from the Amoco notice in late 1983 until the end of 1985,
when the entire miarket crumbled into a 'spot market' environment." The
Commissioner the:n ordered, as follows:
(a) A marketing owner who was overproduced on December 31,
1985, must account "proportionately to each [underproduced] nontaking owner who is not a party to balancing agreement," in cash,
on the basis of the actual price received on a month to month basis.
(b) An owner to whom a cash accounting is due shall notify the
operator, providing evidence of its interest and the period of time
during which such party was not taking his share. "Operator shall
notify each oierproduced party immediately."
(c) An owner owing a cash accounting must pay the operator, in
cash, within (0 days of receipt of the aforementioned notice, but the
operator, before making payment, may deduct any unpaid well
costs. Operator must make payment within 30 days of receipt of
funds, together with a detailed statement "showing volumes of unit
production sold, price received, dates, and costs and expenses
deducted."
(d) For the period commencing January 1, 1986, the share of
production allocable to an owner who is not a party to a balancing
agreement "shall be partitioned and accounted for in the following
manner":
(i) "Any underproduced owner shall be entitled to take and
market Lis share plus an additional amount determined by
multiplying 37.5% of the joint interest share of an
overproduced owner or owners by a fraction, the numerator of
which is the percent interest in the unit of said underproduced
owner and the denominator of which is the total percentage
interest of all underproduced owners then recouping gas. The
first gas iecouped shall be attributable to the first gas taken by
an overproduced owner as overproduction."
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(ii) If, upon depletion, the owners are not in balance, the
overproduced owners must account to the underproduced
owners, in cash, as above provided.
G. Subsequent JudicialReview.
Amoco, Chevron and others sought judicial review of this Order.
On October 10, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment reversing that
portion of the Commissioner's Order which mandated a cash accounting.
In his oral reasons for judgment, the trial judge explained his
interpretation of the Court of Appeal's earlier decision, as follows:
My understanding of the Court of Appeals' (sic) decision is if you
run out of gas and there's no way to partition in kind because there's
nothing left for the landowners to produce thereafter to make up
their proportion, then you divide up the money. But if there is
enough gas left in the ground to make up the "in kind" amount of
gas which the nonproducing owners have not been able to produce,
then they are given the right to produce gas thereafter until they
make up the amount of gas to even up with the other owners. That's
my understanding of what the Court of Appeals (sic) meant.
On June 26, 1990, the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the
judgment of the trial court and reinstated the Supplemental Order of the
Commissioner of Conservation.20 7 in so doing, the Court of Appeal
rejected the aforequoted language of the trial court by saying:
If we had intended that well depletion, which is an example of a
circumstance that can warrant a cash accounting, were to be the sole
criterion for allowance of a cash accounting, it would have been
unnecessary for us to remand the case for the inclusion of the
Commissioner's expertise. The amount of gas remaining in a well is
a fact which can ordinarily be satisfactorily calculated, and the
record will either reveal depletion or it will not. No discretion or
balancing of interests is necessary.
H. Litigation Subsequent to Amoco v. Thompson.
The issue was revisited in Hunt Oil Company v. Batchelor.20 s
Certain units were revised by the Commissioner of Conservation, as a
consequence of which one party (who had owned a greater interest in the
original, pre-revision unit) automatically became "overproduced" and
another party (who had owned a smaller interest in the original, prerevision unit) automatically became "underproduced." This imbalance
arose principally from the fact that "production from the units was
allocated during the 96-day period between the close of the hearihgs and

207
208

566 So.2d 138 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 571 So.2d 627 (La. 1990).
93-3144 (La. 10/17/94); 644 So.2d 191.
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the issuance of the revised unit orders ... to the parties pursuant to the
'old' unit orders."a
Because the-re was no gas balancing agreement between the parties,
the "underproduced" parties filed an application with the Commissioner
of Conservation for an order requiring the "overproduced" parties to
remedy the imbalance through a cash accounting. After a public hearing,
the Commissioner denied the applicants' request for a "cash balancing"
and ordered "balancing in kind."
The plaintiff sought judicial review of the order which was granted,
the trial court reversing the Commissioner's orders based upon its
finding that the Commissioner "had failed to properly apply the
controlling precepts contained in Amoco Production Company v.
Thompson." The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, affirmed the trial court
judgment.2"o
Writs were granted and the Supreme Court framed the issue before
it as "[w]hether, under the particular facts of this case, the plaintiff
underproducers are entitled to a cash accounting by the intervenor
overproducers to correct the existing production imbalance."2 1 1
The Supreme Court stated:
The proper analysis to be applied in this case is that of Amoco I, i.e.,
given balaincing in kind as the preferred method of correcting an
imbalance, does balancing in kind in this particular case either: 1)
cause waste; 2) adversely affect the rights of co-owners to take their
just and equitable share of production in kind, without unnecessary
expense; or 3) adversely affect the correlative rights of co-owners
by limiting their liberty to enjoy their rights or causing damage to
them.
The court also noted that "'just and equitable share' clearly refers to
an owner's right to receive his fair share of the production in its physical
form, i.e., the owner's actual share of the oil and/or gas; it does not mean
the value of the owner's allocable share of the oil and/or gas produced."
The court further observed that "the phrase 'without unnecessary
expense,' . . . ref -rs to unnecessary expenses for physical recovery of the
gas, i.e., drilling costs, workover costs, etc., not ... to the lost time value
of money."
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the orders of the
Commissioner wiich had ordered "balancing in kind."

209
210
211

Id. at 194.
Hunt Oil Company v. Batchelor, 633 So.2d 259, 262 (La.App. Ist Cir. 1993).
Id. at 196.
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6.02 Remedy of Unleased Mineral Owner to Receive Share of
Unitized Production:
A. Statutory ProvisionsRelative to Sale of UnitizedProduction.
As previously noted, after "payout," the unleased mineral owner is
entitled to receive its allocated share of unit production, subject to
bearing its allocated share of unit operating expenses. But to whom may
the unleased mineral owner look to receive its share of unitized
production?
La. R.S. 30:10A(3) provides, as follows:
If there is included in any unit created by the commissioner of
conservation one or more unleased interests for which the party or
parties entitled to market production therefrom have not made
arrangements to separately dispose of the share of such production
attributable to such tract, and the unit operator proceeds with the
sale of unit production, then the unit operator shall pay to such party
or parties such tract's pro rata share of the proceeds of the sale of
production within one hundred eighty days of such sale.
The import and effect of this statute was explained by one court,212
as follows:
La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) allows the operator of a unit*to market the
production of the unit even if he has no contractual relationship with
the mineral interest owners in the unit. The trade-off for this
statutory authorization is that it creates an obligation in which the
unit operator is required to pay the parties entitled to market
production their pro-rata share of the proceeds of the sale within
180 days of such sale. The statute affords a greater protection to
unleased owners than is enjoyed by mineral lessees.
When all mineral interests in the unit are leased, the lessees are
merely entitled to a pro rata share of production from the unit. The
lessees are owners under La. R.S. 30:3(8), and have the exclusive
right to their share of production. This share can be delivered in
cash or in kind, but lessees are only entitled to share in the cash
proceeds of the sale of production in certain situations. See Hunt Oil
Company v. Batchelor,93-3144 (La. 10/17/94); 644 So.2d 191.
La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) was enacted for the benefit of both the unit
operator and the unleased interest. It protects the unleased interests
and avoids undue delays in the sale of production. Leased interests
are usually entitled to only an in kind share of production, which
they then market. It is then the lessee's duty to distribute the
proceeds under its contract with its lessor. When there is no lessee,
the mineral interest owner must deal directly with the unit operator,
212

King v. Strohe, 95-656 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 5/8/96); 673 So.2d 1329.
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with whom he has no contractual relationship. In order to facilitate
the sale of the minerals, La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) provides a quasicontractual relationship between the unit operator and the mineral
interest owner. See Taylor v. David New Operating Co., Inc., 619
So.2d 1251 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 625 So.2d 1046 (La.
1993).
This statute has been interpreted in a series of cases arising out of
the same set of facts.
B. Rights Against PurchaserofProduction.
In Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp.,2 13 the Supreme Court stated the
issue, as follows:
The issue in this case is whether a party claiming rights as an
unleased mineral interest owner in a pooled drilling unit, who has
made no arrangements to separately dispose of the share of unit
production attributable to his land, has a right and/or cause of action
against a purchaser of unit production to recover the value of his
share.
The court answered the question in the negative, "expressly
hold[ing] that :he Taylors' claim against . . .the purchaser of unit
production is prohibited by LSA-R.S. 30:10(A)(3)."
The plaintiffs then attempted to "formulate their action as one based
on unjust enrichment or for the recovery of a corporeal movable or its
value under Civil Code articles 2301 and 2312," both of which were
rejected.
As to the claim in unjust enrichment, the court easily disposed of
that claim on the basis of established law that an "action for unjust
enrichment is allowed only when the plaintiff has no other remedy at
law.""' Finding that the plaintiff had a remedy against the unit operator,
a claim for unjust enrichment against the purchaser of production was
not proper.
As to the second alternative claim for the recovery of a corporeal
movable, the court rejected such claim in the following words, to-wit:
An action under LSA-C.C. art. 2301 is based on the Taylors' claim
that Ashland unduly received their share of unit production. As
owners of an unleased interest who have not made arrangements to
separately dispose of their share of production, the Taylors' right to
take possession of their share of production is limited by the unit
operator's right to sell their share. Upon sale by the unit operator, an
unleased interest owner's right to recovery is limited to recovery of
a pro rata share of the proceeds of the sale from the operator. The
m.. 562 So.2d 88E (La. 1990).
214

Minyard v. CtrtisProducts, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So.2d 422 (1967).
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Taylors have no action to recover their share of production or the
value of their share of production from Ashland, the purchaser, on
the basis of articles 2301 and 2312 because of the provisions of
LSA-R.S. 30:10(A)(3).
C. Rights Against Unit Operator.
In Taylor v. Smith,2 15 an operator was sued by unleased mineral
owners, seeking to recover their share of unit production. The operator
asserted an objection of liberative prescription of one year, contending
that the claim of the plaintiffs sounded in tort (conversion) and not in
contract. The trial court granted that objection, holding that the plaintiffs'
"cause of action to recover royalty interest wrongfully sold or converted
must be filed within one year of the taking or conversion.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed, finding the
claim of the plaintiffs to be "a cause of action in quasi-contract under
LSA-C.C. art. 2292, et seq., insofar as the operator, in selling the
owner's proportionate share -of the oil produced, is acting as a
negotiorum gestor or manager of the owner's business in. selling the oil
produced." As such, it was subject to a liberative prescription of ten (10)
years.216 To the same effect was Taylor v. David New Operating
Company, Inc."'
6.03 Right to Demand Recordable Act of Release:
Under Article 206, et seq., of the Louisiana Mineral Code, if a
mineral lease has expired, and the lessee does not give the lessor an
instrument of cancellation from the public records, the lessor can recover
attorney's fees.
Under Article 208 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, the existence of a
good faith dispute is immaterial, as long as cancellation is directed.
A court has noted that the effect of the release statute (what is now
Article 206 of the Mineral Code) is to place on lessees as a class the
economic burden of lawsuits that they lose."'
Article 207 states that, if such act is not timely provided, the former
mineral lessee ". . . is liable to the person in whose favor the right or the
619 So.2d 881 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied 625 So.2d 1038 (La. 1993).
"Unless otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject to a
liberative prescription of ten years." Article 3499, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
217
619 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied 625 So.2d 1046 (La. 1993). See
215
216

also Northcott Exploration Company, Inc. v. W. R. Grace and Company, Inc., 430 So.2d

1077 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1983) ("It is our opinion that plaintiffs action is primarily
petitory and does not sound in tort. Thus, the one-year prescription, liberandi causa,
which applies to actions resulting from offenses or quasi offenses, LSA-C.C. Article
3536, is patently without application as this is a real action in which plaintiff seeks to
have its ownership in certain immovables recognized.").
218
Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 237 La. 1015, 112 So.2d 695 (1959).
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lease has been extinguished or expired for all damages resulting
therefrom and for a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in bringing suit."
(Emphasis added). Under this statute, the mineral owner may recover
only those damages which are proved to be "resulting" from the failure
to timely provide the release. This gives rise to the question: In order to
recover damages, is it necessary that the landowner prove that it lost "an
actual, identifiable opportunity" to lease the land due to the lessee's
failure or refusal to provide a timely release?
The mere existence of an expired mineral lease does not, of itself,
preclude a landowner from granting a valid mineral lease over the lands
described in the expired, albeit unreleased, mineral lease. On the
contrary, even where there exists a valid and subsisting mineral lease of
record, this is done quite frequently in the oil and gas industry by the
granting of what is euphemistically referred to as a "top lease."2 1 9
Therefore, in order to recover damages, it is incumbent upon the
former lessor to identify:
1. a particular leasing opportunity;
2. a pctential lessee "ready, willing and able" to purchase a lease;
and
3. most importantly, evidence that the willing lessee did not
pursue the leasing or top-leasing of the lands due to the record
existence of the expired mineral lease.
The requirement in Article 207 that any damages must be
"resulting" from the failure to timely record a release of the mineral lease
is consistent with the general-Louisiana law on damages which requires
the complain:ng party to prove an actual economic loss and forbids
recovery on the basis of speculation and conjecture.22 o Thus, "a plaintiff
may not be compensated for damages which he has not suffered." 21
The requirement that damages must be for a definite economic loss
and cannot be based on speculation also exists in demands for damages
under Article 206, et seq., of the Mineral Code.
The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed this issue in the case of
Crane v. Sun Oil Company.22 2 In Crane, the court reviewed the former
La. R.S. 30:102, the predecessor to Article 206 et seq.223 The court
described the issue before it, as follows:
See Stacy ,. Midstates Oil Corporation, 214 La. 173, 36 So.2d 714 (1948) and
219
Scoggin v. Bagley, 368 So.2d 763 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1979).
220 "Damages are measured by the loss sustained by the obligee and the profit of which
he has been deprived." Article 1995, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
222

See Terrell v. Nanda, 33,242 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 5/10/00); 759 So.2d 1026, 1031.
255 La. 1017, 233 So.2d 919 (1970).

223

The commcnt to Article 206 states that Articles 206 through 209 are a redraft of La.

221

-

Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008

125

-

67

Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 7

The sole issue before us now is whether or not the plaintiff has
shown that she was damaged by reason of her inability to enter into
another lease because of the non-cancellation of the lease involved
in this litigation. In this situation, as in all others involving a claim
for damages, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish with
reasonable certainty, or by a preponderance of the evidence, that
such damage occurred, as well as the extent thereof.
Thus, the mineral owner has the burden of proof to establish with
"reasonable certainty, or by a preponderance of the evidence," that it has
been damaged and to prove the extent of such damage.
In Crane, the mineral lessee did not timely provide the release. The
lessor in Crane attempted to prove his damages through a letter
agreement signed with certain parties which described those parties'
"wish to acquire" a mineral lease on the lessor's lands upon obtaining the
requested release. The Supreme Court, upon review of the entire letter
agreement, concluded that it was not a binding agreement of lease and
that the lessor had failed to establish any entitlement to damages.
The United States Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, analyzed a claim
for damages under the statute and noted,224 as follows:
Rather, Mills' [the lessor of a lease in which the release had not
been timely granted] damages are measured by the difference
between his current position and the position he would have
occupied had Davis [the lessee in the mineral lease] timely complied
with his statutory duty [to timely provide the release].
The requirement that the damages be "certain" and not subject to
speculation exists in other Louisiana oil and gas situations. For example,
in suits to cancel a mineral lease for failure to comply with the implied
obligation to further develop the lease, the court will evaluate the
existence (or not) of a bonafide offer to lease the property as an element
of the case.225 This is, of course, consistent with the general Louisiana
rule that damages must be proven with specificity and cannot be based

on speculation.226
R.S. 30:101-102 and that no change of substance was intended.
224
Mills v. Davis Oil Company, 11 F.3rd 1298, 1303 (5th Cir. 1994).
225 See, e.g. Middleton v. California Company, 237 La.1039, 112 So.2d 704 (1959);
Saulters v. Sklar, 158 So.2d 460 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ refused 160 So.2d 227 (La.
1964); and Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d Ill (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1954).
226 For other examples of Louisiana oil and gas cases in which the court prohibited the
use of speculation and conjecture in awarding damages, see Louisiana Gas & Fuel
Company v. White Bros., 157 La. 728, 103 So. 23 (1925); LeBleu v. Vacuum Oil Co., 15
La.App. 639, 132 So. 233 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1931); McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co.,
184 La. 101, 165 So. 632 (1936) (". . . damages were not allowed because of the

uncertain and speculative nature of the loss complained of."); Ferguson v. Britt, 191 La.
371, 185 So. 287 (1938) ("We can only rest our judgment '* * * on the basis of certainty,
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In a seeming departure from the precedents noted above, the court in
Chesapeake Operating,Inc. v. Richardson2 27 said no:
The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. [The
landowner] need only prove it more probable than not he would
have becn able to lease his property had [the lessee] complied with
its statutory duty.
A little known, and much ignored, statute is La. R.S. 30:102 which
requires "Les sees to notify lessors of the termination of mineral leases"
Within ninety days after the expiration of:
(1) Production under a mineral lease previously maintained by
production and
(2) all other rights to maintain that lease,
the lessee or his assigns shall notify the lessor or his representative
that the lease has terminated, unless such notification is already
provided in the lease.
6.04 Right to Require Removal of Surface Equipment or Facilities:
A. Preface.
As noted in Section 4.01 hereof, the lessee has the right to remove
its surface equipment and subsurface casing or tubing during the lease
and for a reasonable time thereafter. If the lessee fails to remove its
equipment, the lessor has certain rights to require such removal. While
there is direct codal authority which addresses the duty of the rights and
obligations of the lessor and lessee relative to these issues, it is
instructive to first review thexrelevant jurisprudence established prior to
the comprehensive amendment of the Louisiana law of lease.228
As will be seen, the issue of the ownership of equipment post-lease
termination has consequences other than those related to the right or duty
to remove such. In some instances, the continuing presence of equipment
placed on the (former) leased premises by the lessee gives rise to issue of
liability when a third party is injured by such equipment.
B. Jurispnrudence.
In a non-mineral lease case,229 the court said the following relative
to the right of the lessor to demand removal of surface structures placed
on the property by the former lessee, to-wit:
and not on mere conjecture and speculation'.").
22. 2004-345 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 10/13/04); 884 So.2d 1263. In the interest of full
disclosure, your author represented the operator in this case.
228
As previously stated, the general law of lease would apply to a mineral lease as
suppletive law in the absence of authority in the Louisiana Mineral Code. Article 2,
Louisiana Mineral Code.
229 Dietz i. The SuperiorOil Company, 252 So.2d 198 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied
259 La. 945, 253 So.2d 383 (1971).
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The defendant-appellant, in urging the reversal of the trial court's
decision in the instant case, argues that the lessor is under no duty to
remove the structures and improvements placed on the leased
premises.
Article 2719 and 2720 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 make it
clear that it is the duty of the lessee to deliver the leased premises
back to the lessor at the end of the term, in the same state in which it
was when the lessee took possession of it. Unless the contract
between the parties provides otherwise, it is the duty of the lessee to
deliver back the premises in the same condition in which they were
received.
The contract of lease between the parties provided that the lessee
would have the exclusive use of the land and the right to erect,
maintain, and repair on the property, and remove therefrom all types
of improvements, including machine shops, buildings, sheds,
pipelines, equipment, and other improvements. The lease further
provided that the lessor waived any legal right that the lessor might
have to retain improvements and additions made by the lessee, even
those made with lime and cement.
The trial court held, in interpretation of this contract, that since the
lessor specifically waived his right to purchase and retain the
improvements and additions made by the lessee, it followed that the
lessor has the right to compel the lessee to remove the
improvements and additions which he placed on the leased property.
If the parties had intended that the lessee should be allowed to leave
or abandon any improvements or additions at the time the term or
extended term of the lease terminated, this could have been
specifically provided in the contract.
The trial judge, in his written reasons for judgment, stated:
'Under the Louisiana Civil Code the lessee must return the thing
leased in the same state in which it was when taken possession of by
him, except, of course, for ordinary wear and tear and unavoidable
accidents. The lessee has the right to remove the improvements that
he has made to the thing let provided he leaves it in the state in
which he received it, but if these additions be made with lime and
cement, the lessor may retain them upon paying a fair pric.e. The
tenant had the right at the expiration of the lease to remove all his
improvements and additions unless the lessor chooses to retain such
as may be made with lime and cement and pay the tenant the value
thereof.'
We think this is a proper statement of the applicable law. The
contract of lease between the parties does not relieve the lessee of
his obligation to return the leased premises in the state in which he
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received them. Rather, the lease specifically denies the lessor his
right to elect to keep the improvements made with lime and cement.
We are of the opinion that it was the intent of the parties, as
reflected in the contract made between them, that the lessee would
remove aL improvements and restore the leased premises at the end
of the lease term. For this reason, we find no error in the trial court's
ruling which ordered and directed the defendant to remove all
improvements placed upon the property and to level the property.
The right of a landowner to demand that a pipeline servitude owner
remove the pipeline after the owner had discontinued using the pipeline
was considered in Guzzetta v. The Texas Pipe Line Company.230 There, a
landowner sued the defendant to recover the costs of pipeline removal.
The court observed that "Louisiana law provides that ownership of an
abandoned pipeline reverts to the owner of the land if the owners refuse
to remove it within ninety days of demand," citing Article 493 of the
Louisiana Revised Civil Code.13' The court further stated that, "after the
failure to remove the pipeline within ninety days of written notice, the
ownership of the pipeline would revert to the plaintiffs."
The failure to comply with the requirements of Statewide Order No.
29-B gives rise to liability on the part of the operator to third persons
who might be injured on the premises.2 32
In Billiot v. State of Louisiana,3 Forest Oil Corporation was held
liable to shrimpers who "struck the submerged casing of a formerly landbased well plugged and abandoned by Forest Oil Corporation in 1957."
Subsequent to the well being plugged and abandoned by Forest, the land
on which the well was situated came to be part of the Gulf of Mexico by
reason of coastal erosion. After plugging and abandoning the well in
1957, Forest had no involvement with the well. The plaintiffs shrimp
boat struck the casing in 1990. Claims against the former private
landowner (Forest's original lessor) and against the State of Louisiana
(the owner of the area where the well was situated, after the coastal
erosion) were dismissed, but the demands against Forest were allowed
because it had the garde of the casing, which was considered Forest's
immovable property.
485 So.2d 5(8 (La. 1986).
231
This article - quoted in footnote 240, infra - was cited as authority for the
granting to the "ovmer of the improvements the right to remove them, but if he does not
do so ninety days after written demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership of the
improvements. It coes not give the new owner of the improvements the right to compel
removal by the old owner, nor to recover payment for the costs of removal."
230

232

Cockerham i. Atlantic Richfield Co., 615 So.2d 547 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied

623 So.2d 1303 (La. 1993).
233
94-1365 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 4/12/95); 654 So.2d 753, writ denied 95-1772 (La.
I1/13/95); 662 So.2d 467.
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In Melerine v. State of Louisiana,2 34 the Court of Appeal stated that,
in its view, Cockerham was "incorrect," as a result of which, "it does not
provide any guidance to this court on this issue." The court found that the
"Amended Statewide Order 29-B, which changed the regulations
governing plugging and abandonment of oil wells, is a substantive
provision because it unquestionably established new rules, rights, and
duties or changed existing ones." In view of that conclusion, the court
held that "the Commissioner of Conservation had no authority to apply
the amended order retroactively." Based on this conclusion, the court
held that "amendments to regulations adopted after work was concluded
do not change the obligations of [the mineral lessees]."
In Anderson v. Tenneco Oil Company,235 plaintiffs were injured
when their boat struck a series of pilings surrounding a well casing. The
well had been drilled on certain waterbottoms owned by the State of
Louisiana by an oil company. Plaintiffs sued the oil company and the
state for the damages caused by the above allision.236 The plaintiffs
settled with the oil company, but continued to trial with the state. The
trial court found that the state owned the pilings and that the state was,
therefore, solely responsible. The state appealed.
The oil company drilled the well in 1964 on certain waterbottoms
pursuant to an oil and gas lease granted by the state. In the course of
preparing to drill the well, the lessee constructed certain wood pilings
around it. The operations were not successful and the well was a dry
hole. Subsequently, the well was plugged and abandoned with the State
Lease terminating. It was subsequently released. Apparently, no question
was raised about the pilings which were left by the lessee in place in the
waterbottoms.
The state argued that the pilings remained the separate immovable
property of the oil company since they did not demand removal of the
pilings. The plaintiffs, having already settled with the oil company,
argued to the contrary, that since they were not removed, the pilings were
now owned by the state. The court, after reviewing this matter, held for
the plaintiffs.
The law appears to be clear in the case of constructions made with
the landowner's permission, especially since the rendition of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Guzzetta v. Texas Pipe Line

2000-0162 (La.App. 4th Cir. 11/8/00); 773 So.2d 831, writ denied 2001-0382,
2001-0480 (La. 4/12/01); 789 So.2d 595, 599.
235
2001-0295, 2001-0296 (La.App. 4th Cir. 5/22/02); 826 So.2d 1143, writ denied
2002-2035 (La. 11/1/02); 828 So.2d 585.
236
"An allision is a collision between a moving vessel and a stationery object."
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 14-2, 89, n. 1 (4th ed. 2004).
234

-
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Co."' That case - dealing with a pipeline that had been left in place by
the company -- held that the constructions automatically revert to the
landowner if the maker fails to remove the construction after he no
longer has permission to keep it on the landowner's land. When the
landowner, some time after the pipeline servitude had terminated, sought
to compel the company to remove it, the company refused on the basis
that it now belonged to the landowner.238
Melerine and Anderson were abrogated by the Louisiana Supreme
23 9 a "civil case
Court in Giorgio v. Alliance Operating Corporation,
[which] addresse[d] the legal question of whether the State of Louisiana
is liable for an allision that occurred when a fishing boat allided with an
unlit, unmarked "orphaned" oilfield production platform in the Breton
Sound area of the Gulf of Mexico."
The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
erred in its interpretation of Article 493 of the Louisiana Revised Civil
Code." The ccurt stated, as follows:
The court of appeal committed legal error in their statutory
interpretation by reading out the 90-day written notice requirement.
The Melerine court did rely on Guzzetta in reaching its conclusion,
citing: "Again, after the failure to remove the pipeline within ninety
days of written notice, the ownership of the pipeline would revert to
the plaintiffs." Melerine, 773 So.2d at 838. (Emphasis in original).
The court erred in failing to emphasize the necessary prerequisite
for the legal transfer of ownership - "within ninety days of written
notice." Rather, the court interpreted the holding in Guzzetta to
mean "ownership reverts by operation of law to the landowner when
the maker of the building fails to remove it after he no longer has
permissior. to keep it on the landowner's land." 773 So.2d at 83839. Therefore, the Melerine court concluded the reversion of
ownership is controlled not by the landowner's issuance of the 90-

237
238

Cited at footnote 230, supra.
The Andersc n court also cited the decision in Melerine, cited at footnote 234,

supra.

2005-0002 (La. 1/19/06); 921 So.2d 58.
Buildings, o1her constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plantings
made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made them. They belong
to the owner of the ground when they are made without his consent.
When the owner of buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the
ground, or plantinf.s no longer has the right to keep them on the land of another, he may
remove them subject to his obligation to restore the property to its former condition. If he
does not remove hem within 90 days after written demand, the owner of the land
acquires ownership of the improvements and owes nothing to their former owner.
29
240
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day notice to remove, but by the actions of the maker of the
building. Id.
Because the lessee in Melerine failed to remove the well casing after
it no longer had the right to keep the casing on state property, the
court found ownership of the casing reverted to the State, even in

the absence of a 90-day demand notice. Contrarily, we find the clear
and unambiguous language of La. Civ.Code art 493 as written in
1997 specifically required written notice or demand prior to the
transfer of ownership. La. Civ.Code art 9.
In the present case, the platform and pilings attached to the land
subject to State Lease 8342 were made on the land with the consent
of the State. Therefore, upon the termination and release of all rights
to the water bottom under State Lease 8342, all the rights in and to
the water bottom reverted back to the owner, the State of Louisiana,
and according to article 493 as written in 1997, the ownership of the
platform and pilings as constructions permanently attached to the
ground remained with him who made them, the lessee. The
ownership so remains until failure of the lessee to remove the
platform and pilings within ninety days of written notice. In the
present case, the record contains no evidence of written notice of
removal, and accordingly, the ownership of the constructions
belongs to him who made them. Ownership has not reverted to the
State.
C. Codal Authority.
All of the cases cited above were based upon operative facts arising
under the provisions. of the Civil Code as they existed prior to the
comprehensive revision to the law of lease accomplished in 2004.241
Those cases invoked Article 493 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code
dealing with the notion of accession in relation to immovables. This
article was amended in 2003242 and, in 2004, the Louisiana Legislature
adopted a resolution declaring its intent that the 2003 amendment to
Article 493 was intended "to legislatively overrule the decisions in
Guzetta, Melerine and Anderson. 243
Since those amendments, the matter is addressed by Article 2695,
Louisiana Revised Civil Code, which reads, as follows:
In the absence of contrary agreement, upon termination of the lease,
the rights and obligations of the parties with regard to attachments,
additions, or other improvements made to the leased thing by the
lessee are as follows:
2
242
243

Act No. 821 of the 2004 Louisiana Legislature, effective January 1, 2005.
Act No. 715 of the 2003 Louisiana Legislature.
House Concurrent Resolution No. 306 of the 2004 Louisiana Legislature.

-
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(1) The lessee may remove all improvements that he made to the
leased thing, provided that he restore the thing to its former
condition.
(2) If the lessee does not remove the improvements, the lessor
may:
(a) Appropriate ownership of the improvements by reimbursing
the lessee for their costs or for the enhanced value of the leased
thing whichever is less; or
(b) Demand that the lessee remove the improvements within a
reasonable time and restore the leased thing to its former condition.
If the lessee fails to do so, the lessor may remove the improvements
and restore tie leased thing to its former condition at the expense of
the lessee or appropriate ownership of the improvements without
any obligationa of reimbursement to the lessee. Appropriation of the
improvement by the lessor may only be accomplished by providing
additional notice by certified mail to the lessee after expiration of
the time given the lessee to remove the improvements.
(c) Until such time as the lessor appropriates the improvement, the
improvements shall remain the property of the lessee and the lessee
shall be solely responsible for any harm caused by the
improvements.
The Revision Comments - 2004 to Article 2695 suggest that the
amendment was intended to address the "deficiencies and inequities of
the law of accession" as applied in the lease relationship, and that this
revised article "attempts to cure these deficiencies by providing a special
self-contained rule applicable directly to leases of immovables as well as
of movables." Accordingly, the rule of Article 2695 "applies only if the
relationship between the two parties qualifies as a lease."
VII. Obligations of Unleased Mineral Owner
7.01 Responsibility for Other Unit Costs or Expenses:
A. Unit Operaring Expenses.
Once "payout" is achieved, the non-participating owner is entitled to
participate in unit production to the extent of its interest. It is also liable
for its proportionate: part of unit operating expenses which, as in the case
of the recoupment of unit well costs, is to be taken out of production
except to the extent that the unleased mineral owner elects to be
personally responsible to pay such costs "out of pocket."
B. Pluggingad Abandonment Costs.
A well which is drilled and which produces is a well which, at some
point in time, will be plugged and abandoned. By obvious definition,
income ceases prior to the time which the P&A expenses are incurred.
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A lessee is obligated to properly plug and abandon a well which it
drills.244 The cost associated with the plugging and abandonment of wells
can be significant, and, by definition, it is:typically incurred at the end of
the mineral lease, when no further revenue is to be gained from the lease
- "outgo" with no corresponding "income."
The cost of plugging and abandoning the well is a cost which arises
as a consequence of both the drilling of the well and the production of oil
and gas therefrom. As both of these benefit the non-participating owner
to the extent that it participates in production, equity dictates that the
non-participating owner should also be required to participate in the
expense associated with the unavoidable and inevitable plugging and
abandonment. However, as noted, these P&A costs are necessarily
incurred at a point in time when no revenue is being generated in respect
of the interest of the non-participating owner, and there is typically no
agreement with such an owner by which it would be obligated to be
personally liable for such costs.
A good argument could be made that the operator should be entitled
to anticipate such costs and withhold out of production an amount to be
held in reserve to discharge the obligation of the non-participating owner
to share in these costs. Authority for this proposition might be found in
the articles of the Civil Code.245
C Other Expenditures for Which the Unleased Mineral Owner
Might be Liable.
If the case can be made that the unleased mineral owner would be
responsible for its proportionate share of P&A costs, one might wonder
how far such theory could be extended to other liabilities which might
visit the operator, in some cases, many years after the final abandonment
of the field. For example, what about liability for environmental
remediation expenses associated with E&P operations?
As noted previously, an unleased mineral owner could be an
"owner" within the meaning of the Conservation Act.246 As such, there
would be statutory and regulatory authority for liability to attach to such
an owner.
While clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it is to be noted that
Act No. 312 of the 2006 Louisiana Legislature provides that, under
certain circumstances, "the finder of fact determines that environmental
damage exists and determines the party or parties who caused the
damage or who are otherwise legally responsible therefor, the court shall
The Louisiana Office of Conservation has promulgated Statewide Order No. 29-B
which dictates the manner in which a well must be plugged and abandoned. See LAC
43:XIX. 137.
245
Articles 2054 and 2055, Louisiana Revised Civil Code, set forth on Page 23 hereof.
246
See Section 1.02 hereof, supra.
244
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order the party or parties who admit responsibility or whom the court
finds legally responsible for the damage to develop a plan or submittal
for the evaluation or remediation to applicable standards of the
contamination that resulted in the environmental damage."2 47
Recalling the discussion above,2 48 a unit operator has been likened
to an agent pro hoc vice. If that is the proper characterization, the
unleased mineral owner would be likened to a principal in such a
relationship. Unde-r agency law, the "principal is bound to reimburse the
mandatary for the expenses and charges he has incurred and to pay him
1:he remuneration to which he is entitled."2 49 Moreover, the "principal is
bound to compen:;ate the mandatary for loss the mandatary sustains as a
result of the mandate, but not for loss caused by the fault of the
mandatary."2 so If nothing else, this analysis demonstrates why it is
important to unc.erstand the nature of the relationship between the
unleased mineral owner and the operator.
While the un eased mineral owner is not generally liable for costs of
unit operations "out of pocket," and although the operator is generally
relegated to enfor-ing its right of contribution out of production, still, if
the unleased mineral owner were held responsible for its share of
environmental reiMediation expenses (under the theory that, as an
"owner," it has benefited from the production which gave rise to the
environmental liability, or that, as a "principal," it is "bound to
reimburse" its mandatary), such responsibility should be capped at the
amount of production which the unleased mineral owner has received
from the well giving rise to the environmental damage. The fact that the
unleased mineral owner had already spent all of its proceeds of
production should not mean that the operator (or third party plaintiff) is
attempting to violate the "out of pocket" limitation.
As your author is unaware of any reported case in which this
responsibility has been held to attach to the unleased mineral owner, the
best we can do, at present, is to place this discussion in the "food for
thought" department.
7.02 Risk Fee Statute - La. R.S. 30:1OA(2):
Louisiana law affords an operator the option to invite third parties
with which it has ro contractual relationship to share in the cost, risk and
expense of drilling a unit well. It is explicitly stated that the statute "shall
not apply to any uileased interest not subject to an oil, gas, and mineral
lease." 25'
247

La. R.S. 30:29C(1).

2411 See Section 1.02 hereof, supra.
249 Article 3012, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
250
Article 3013, Louisiana Revised Civil Code.

251

La. R.S. 30:1OA(2)(e).
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Does the statute have any application whatsoever to unleased
mineral owners? Despite the fact that, under La. R.S. 30:10A(2)(e), the
risk charge may not be imposed as against an unleased mineral owner,
note that such statute provides that only the provisions of La. R.S.
30:10A(2)(b) "with respect to a risk charge shall not apply to any
unleased interest not subject to an oil, gas, and mineral lease." It does not
say that the entirety of the Risk Fee Statute "shall not apply to any
unleased interest not subject to an oil, gas, and mineral lease," only the
cited statutory provisions "with respect to a risk charge." In other words,
while the risk charge may under no circumstances be applied to the
unleased owner, it might be that all [see subparagraph III.B.3(b) above]
unleased owners must be given the same notice and right to elect to
participate as all other owners, leased or unleased. It is unclear as to the
consequences of a failure to give notice to "all" unleased owners, or
whether a party who received notice has standing to complain about the
failure to give notice to another party.
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the statute to an unleased
mineral owner, a circumstance might arise if a tract of land was in fact
leased (to someone other than the operator which drills the well), that
lessee does not elect to share in the cost, risk and expense of the unit
well, the operator proceeds to impose the risk charge with- respect to that
interest, and the lessee releases the mineral lease. Where does this leave
the operator? Can it continue to impose the risk charge to the (now)
unleased mineral owner?
In Duplantis v. OSD, L.L.C.,252 the Court of Appeal, First Circuit,
affirmed the trial court judgment which held that an operator was entitled
to impose the risk fee penalty against the production accruing to an
unleased landowner after the mineral lease was cancelled.
7.03 Determination of Title and Ownership:
By definition, the absence of a mineral lease as to a particular
unitized tract of land means that the operator - who presumably was not
the former lessee - has most likely not incurred the expense of
examining title to such tract of land in which the (unleased) mineral
owners own the right to explore. There is no express law which requires
the operator to examine title; it is done as a matter of commercial
prudence in that the operator wants assurance that. it will be paying the
proper owners. Were the operator to pay the wrong person, it would not
2000-2119 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/9/01); 817 So.2d 510 (table), writ denied 20020608 (La. 4/26/02); 814 So.2d 564 (not designated for publication). A case "not
designated for publication" should not be quoted or cited in any respect. Roberts v.
Sewage and Water Board, 92-2048 (La. 3/21/94); 634 So.2d 341. See also Rule 2-16.3,
Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal ("Opinions marked 'Not Designated for Publication'
shall not be cited, quoted, or referred to by any counsel, or in any argument, brief, or
other materials presented to any court, except in continuing or related litigation.").
252
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discharge its legal responsibility to the proper owner, and the operator
would be relegated to a suit to recover the wrongful payments.25 3
It is not uncommon for an operator to insist that the mineral owner
claiming ownership of the oil and gas produced from the unleased tract
must demonstrate that he is the proper owner to whom payments are due.
The operator, however, must be reasonable and a court might very well
conclude that the operator has an obligation to examine title as part of its
duty to "afford the owner of each tract the opportunity to recover or
receive his just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the pool without
unnecessary expense."254
If a tract is leased to a party other than the unit operator, and that
lessee has not contributed to the cost, risk or expense of the unit well, the
proposition is all the stronger that the non-participating lessee of that
tract - not the operator - ought to bear the burden and associated expense
of examining title to its leased premises.
While no ase has considered this issue, it is a natural consequence
of the fact that the non-participating owner who sues the operator for its
share of unitized production must carry the burden of proof to establish
(at least by a preponderance of evidence) that it is the rightful owner of
the property at issue. 2"
7.04 Right of Operator to Drill on Tract Which is Not Fully Leased:
A. Preface,
Although, properly speaking, it is neither a "right" nor an
"obligation" of an unleased mineral owner in a producing unit (as the
title of this pre:;entation promised), some consideration should be given
to the circumstances under which, contrary to the wishes of an unleased
mineral owner, operations may still be conducted on the co-owned land
(or with respect to a co-owned mineral servitude) in which such unleased
mineral owner has an interest. In a sense, however, it might be viewed as
an "obligation" of an unleased mineral owner to suffer or tolerate the
circumstance that operations might lawfully be conducted contrary to its
wishes. Or, saying it conversely, the unleased mineral owner may have
no right to object to the conduct of operations in certain circumstances.
The fact that a given tract of land is not fully leased - that is, that
there are undivided interests in the land or under a mineral servitude
"A person who has received a payment or a thing not owed to him is bound to
restore it to the permon from whom he received it." Article 2299, Louisiana Revised Civil
Code.
2
La. R.S. 30:10A(1).
255
This observation is somewhat reminiscent of the famous line uttered by Hedley
Lamarr (played by Harvey Korman) in the classic movie, Blazing Saddles. This villain
planned to buy up land and resell it to the railroad. "Unfortunately," he says, "there is one
thing standing between me and that property - the rightful owners."
233
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which are unleased - does not necessarily mean that the operator which
desires to drill a well on such co-owned tract is unable to do so. Rather,
under certain circumstances, the Louisiana Mineral Code permits the
conduct of operations on the land even if certain owners have failed or
refused to grant their consent and, hence, even against their wishes.
This situation may arise in a variety of contexts, including the
conduct of operations by the following persons, to-wit:
(a) the owner of the entirety of a mineral servitude created by less
than all of the co-owners of land;256
(b) the lessee under a mineral lease granted by less than all of the
co-owners of land which is not, to any extent, burdened by a
mineral servitude;25 7
(c) less than all of the co-owners of a mineral servitude;"' and
(d) the co-owner of land which is not, to any extent, burdened by a
mineral servitude or a miperal lease.2 s'
In these scenarios, certain parties who have the right to consent to the
conduct of operations, have - for whatever reason - not done so, and

may even wish that operations not be conducted.
B. HistoricalApproach to These Issues.
The matters described in (a), (b) and (c), immediately above, are
now regulated by Articles 164, 166 and 175 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code, respectively, discussed below.'" The right of a co-owner of land to
operate in his own right (without a lease being granted) is not addressed
in the Louisiana Mineral Code.
The full effect and legal import of the aforementioned articles may
be fully appreciated only if they are considered in light of the law of coownership which historically prevailed at the time of the enactment of
the Louisiana Mineral Code in 1975, and prior to the amendments in
1986 and 1988.
Prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Mineral Code (and even after
it, but prior to 1986), a mineral lessee was required to obtain the consent
of all co-owners of a co-owned tract of land or of a co-owned mineral
servitude before it could operate on the property. For example, in Gulf
26
Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Carroll,
1 the Louisiana Supreme Court
This scenario is discussed in Section 7.04F hereof.
This scenario is discussed in Section 7.04G hereof.
258
This scenario is discussed in Section 7.04H hereof.
259
This scenario is discussed in Section 7.041 hereof.
260
The scenario described in (d) above is not covered by the Louisiana Mineral Code,
but is discussed in Section 7.041 hereof.
261
145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919).
256
257
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upheld the right of a recalcitrant co-owner to oppose the conduct of
mineral operations by a lessee of a consenting co-owner. The court
stated, as follows:
A co-owner may therefore oppose any attempt by his co-owners, or
by a lessee of his co-owner, to exploit the common property for oil
and gas.
From this source has been derived the maxims, "In re communi
melior est conditio prohibentis" - a maxim meaning, "In common
property the condition of the one prohibiting is the better," - and "In
re commtni neminem dominorum jure facere quicquam, invito
altero, posse," a maxim meaning "One coproprietor can exercise no
authority over ,the common property against the will of the other."
22 Cyc. 1102. Or as the same maxim is more tersely expressed
"Melior est prohibentis." In other words, either co-owner has a right
of veto against the acts of the other. And it is that very legal
situation which underlies the principle that no one can be compelled
to remain :n indivision; that any co-owner may at any time demand
a partition.
By all this is'not meant that the lease is not valid as between the
lessor and the lessee, nor that one may not validly lease property
belonging to another, but what is meant is that such a lease is null in
so far as the co-owner is concerned; on the same principle that the
lease of the- property of another, while valid as between the parties
to the lease, is null in so far as this other is concerned. The idea is
simply the t neither one of the co-owners has any right to any
particular part of the common estate, or to do anything upon it, to
the exclusion of his co-owner.
The Louisi.ana Supreme Court cited Gulf in Sun Oil Company v.
State Mineral Board.. for the proposition that, "as between the parties,
the lease of mineral interests owned in indivision with others is valid
since one may validly lease property belonging to another." The court
went on to say, as follows:
However, it is well established in the cited cases and in the many
authorities following them, see Amerada Petroleum Corporation v.
Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 and cases there cited and Amerada
Petroleum Corporation v. Murphy, 204 La. 721, 16 So.2d 244, that
such a lease is null insofar as the other co-owners are concerned and
a co-owner may oppose any attempt by his co-owners, or by a lessee
of his co-owners, to exploit the common property for oil and gas,
262

231 La. 689, 92 So.2d 583 (1957).
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the theory being that co-owners are owners par mi et par tout, of
part and of the whole, and no co-owner has the exclusive right to
any determinate part of the common property.
As originally enacted, the Louisiana Mineral Code perpetuated the
rule that the consent of all co-owners was necessary before a co-owner
(or a lessee of a co-owner) could operate on the co-owned land or coowned mineral servitude.
Thus, without regard to the fairness, wisdom or propriety of the
rule, the rule at the time of the adoption of the Louisiana Mineral Code
(and prior to amendments in 1986) was clear: The owner of a minute,
undivided interest in a tract of land or mineral servitude could resist oil
and gas operations on the co-owned land or co-owned mineral servitude,
despite the fact that the balance -

or even vast majority -

of the

remaining co-owners desired that such operations be conducted. Stated
differently, any operations on the commonly owned land or co-owned
mineral servitude could be opposed by any co-owner who did not
consent to such operations, regardless of the minuteness of his interest.
As a practical matter, this circumstance resulted in the nonconsenting co-owner enjoying greater "bargaining power" to secure
better terms or higher bonus, rental or royalty than his co-owners who
had already leased. If better terms were received by that last consenting
co-owner, it often led to dissatisfaction among the other co-owners who
rightfully felt that they were being penalized for leasing earlier. The
"holdout" might be said to be rewarded for his recalcitrance while the
cooperating lessors feel that they are penalized by having received lesser
terms."'
With this historical perspective in mind, several articles of the
Louisiana Mineral Code were amended in 1986.26 As amended at that
time, Articles 164, 166 and 175 permitted the conduct of operations with
the consent of less than all of the co-owners, provided that at least ninety
(90%) per cent of the co-owners had expressed their consent to such
operations. The rationale of this amendment was expressed in the
Comment to 1986 Amendment under Article 164 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code, as follows:
The 1986 amendments to Articles 164, 166, and 175 continue to
preserve the principle in the Mineral Code that one co-owner may
not conduct operations without the consent of his co-owner, but
limit this principle so that a small minority of co-owners cannot
One way in which a lessor might protect itself is to utilize a "favored nations"
clause whereby the lessee is obligated to extend or pay to those who signed earlier at
lesser terms or considerations, the greater or better terms or considerations, if granted by
the lessee to a lessor who subsequently signs a mineral lease.
264
Act No. 1047 of the 1986 Louisiana Legislature.
263
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prevent mineral operationsdesired by other owners of rights in land
or mineral rights. (Emphasis added).
The ninety (90%) per cent threshold introduced in 1986 was
lowered in 1988 to eighty (80%) per cent,2 65 but, significantly, a certain
proviso was added at the same time.2" These amendments - as
explained by the Commentary noted above clearly and
unambiguously evince the Legislature's intent to permit the conduct of
oil and gas operations with the consent of not less than eighty (80%) per
cent of the owners of co-owned land or of a co-owned mineral servitude.
C. Calcuiationof Requisite Consent.
As will be seen, the three articles mentioned above now permit the
conduct of operations if the party desiring to conduct such operations has
secured the consent of its co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty
(80%) per cent interest (with a proviso, discussed below). Thus, the issue
is presented as to whether the requisite threshold can be met by including
the interest of the party who desires to conduct operations, or who has
granted its consent to a lessee who desires to accumulate other interests
in order to mert the threshold. The jurisprudence suggests that it is to be
counted.
In Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt,267 a mineral lease was
granted by the widower and five children. After the lease was granted,
the father died, leaving his five children, who thereupon owned the entire
property in indivision, one-fifth to each, subject to the existing lease.
During the term of the lease, one of the children, Richard Leckelt,
executed a mineral deed to William Campbell conveying "an undivided
one-half interest in all the minerals that Richard Leckelt owned in and
under the property."
Thereafter, Richard Leckelt executed a mineral deed to P. S. Moore
"conveying an undivided one-half interest in all the minerals that he
owned in and under the property."
In both instances, the mineral deeds were made subject to the then
existing mineral lease. The outstanding mineral lease expired and was
released. Thereafter, mineral leases were "acquired . . . from all the co-

owners, except Richard Leckelt, and from all the outstanding holders of
minerals rights " A well was drilled pursuant to this mineral lease.
After Riclard Leckelt challenged the validity of this latter lease, the
lessee sued to cancel a mineral lease granted by Richard Leckelt and
other documents which were alleged by the plaintiff to "cast a cloud
upon plaintiffs' titles."
265
266
267

Act No. 647 of the 1988 Louisiana Legislature.
See Section 7.04E hereof, infra.
189 La. 972, 181 So. 462 (1938).
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Richard Leckelt, a defendant, contended that the lease was invalid
because, as a co-owner of the property, his consent was necessary. The
court rejected this contention and upheld the lease, saying:
Richard Leckelt consented to the establishment of the servitude and
he would be estopped from preventing William Campbell from
exercising the servitude under the provisions of article 7396' and
cannot prevent the exercise of the servitude by objecting on the
ground that the consent of the other coproprietors has not been
given. Furthermore he would be estopped from preventing William
Campbell from exercising the servitude by derogating from or
destroying his own grant.
Further support for this conclusion is contained in the Comments to
the 1986 Amendment to Article 164 where it is stated, as follows:
These amendments are intended to be read broadly in favor of
allowing the majority of owners to develop where they so desire.
Thus the [eighty] percent is to be calculated such that it includes the
interest of the owner seeking to gain the consent of others. It is
intended that "co-owner" mean any owner without the consent of
whom development could not be undertaken.
D. Form, Durationand Scope of Consent.
The articles envision the granting of "consent," not necessarily
"leases." Clearly, the granting of a mineral lease is the granting of
consent, but consent may be conferred in other ways, e.g., a letter
agreement or other writing which, while not constituting a "lease" (with
its concomitant reservation of a "royalty"), nevertheless expresses the
consent of the grantor that operations might be conducted on the coowned tract of land or co-owned mineral servitude.
Another issue is the form, duration and scope of the consent, if
granted. Seemingly, the consent can - or arguably should - be in written

form and, if in writing, the party proposing to rely on the consent should
be as explicit as possible as to what is being authorized and the duration
or scope of the consent. If these matters are spelled out with clarity, it is
unlikely that disputes might arise.269
The Superior case found tacit consent based upon actions taken by
the complaining party. While tacit consent is permitted, it fom-es the
question, to what will the co-owner be held to have tacitly consented?
The drilling of one well only? What about multiple wells? The re-entry
See now Article 715 ("A co-owner who has consented to the establishment of a
predial servitude on the entire estate owned in indivision may not prevent its exercise on
the ground that the consent of his co-owner has not been obtained.").
269
There are several articles in the Mineral Code wherein it is required that certain
matters be stated "expressly and in writing." See Articles 54 and 55 (read together), 75,
85, 129 and 145. Notably, Article 164 is not one of them.
268
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of an existing borehole in an attempt to rework or recompleted a
previously pioduced well? The digging of pits? Destruction of trees or
crops? Operations under a different or modified mineral lease?
The mere existence of these questions - to which there are no
apparent answers - argues forcefully for the obtaining of consent
"expressly and in writing."
E. ProvisoAdded in 1988.
As will be seen, since 1988, each of Articles 164, 166 and 175
contains a proviso to the effect that, even having obtained the consent of
not less than eighty (80%) of the relevant co-owners, operations may be
conducted, "provided that he has made every effort to contact such coowners, and, if contacted, has offered to contract with them on
substantially the same basis that he has contracted with another coowner," or words to that effect.
In the "food for thought" department, this proviso presents certain
issues and gives rise to certain questions and observations, including the
following, to-wit:
(a) Is the phrase "every effort" intended to be read literally and
absolutely, or as "every reasonableeffort"? If a lessee cannot locate
an owner by conventional methods, does the lessee have to advertise
in a newspaper in an attempt to ascertain his whereabouts? What
effort will be deemed to fall short of making "every effort" to
contact these parties?
(b) Who is to be contacted? The proviso says "such" co-owners.
But what "such" co-owners? Grammatically, the word "such" as
used in 1his sentence seems to refer to those co-owners who have
already been signed up.270 Sensibly, it probably refers to all coowners with whom the lessee has not contracted.
(c) Does the proviso essentially impose a statutory "favored
nations clause"? If separate and distinct co-owners have granted
separate and distinct leases, to whose other contract is this to be
compared? In this regard, precisely what is meant by "another coowner"? What if the lessee has "cut" five different deals with five
separate and distinct co-owners - different bonus, rental, royalty,
primary term, "Pugh clause" term, other specific provision, etc.?
What is meant by "substantially" the same basis? Is the implication
that, unless the lessee has tried to contact and contract with all coowners, his operations under lease(s) from, say, ninety-five (95%)
per cent of the co-owners can be lawfully opposed by any non-con"Where the word '[such]' modifies a term, that term is limited to previous
identifications of that same term within the statute." Ouachita Parish School Board v.
OuachitaParishSupervisorsAssociation, 362 So.2d 1138 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1978).
270
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tracting parties? What standard of proof will be required to
demonstrate that the lessee has complied with the statute? Should all
offers to lease be in writing? How can a title examiner approve title
for drilling purposes under these circumstances?
(d) Note that the eighty (80%) per cent rule - in the circumstances
when it applies - only addresses the issue of whether operations can
be conducted on the ground. The eighty (80%) per cent rule does
not say that a co-owner cannot grant a mineral lease unless the
consent of not less than eighty (80%) per cent is obtained. For
example, Article 166 says that "the lessee . . . may not exercise his
rights thereunder without consent of co-owners owning at least an
undivided eighty percent interest in the land." The granting of a
mineral lease is one thing; the conduct of operations thereunder is
another matter. A mineral lease can be granted, without regard to
the level of consent, but the lessee cannot operate on the ground
without the requisite level of consent.
(e) A final "what if?" - "What if" the lessee has obtained consent
(in the form of a mineral lease) from, say, ninety-five (95%) per
cent of the co-owners, and also obtains a mineral lease from the
remaining five (5%) per cent of the co-owners, but such latter lease
contains a clause or provision which restricts or denies surface
operations on the tract? The lessee could have conducted operations
from the first mineral lease from ninety-five (95%) per cent of the
co-owners, even if it did not obtain the final lease. Is it now worse
off having obtained leases from all co-owners?
Suffice it to say that these questions have not arisen in the reported
jurisprudence and bear careful consideration by operators and title
examiners.
F. Conduct of Operations by Owner of Mineral Servitude Created
by Co-owner ofLand.
Let's assume that a tract of land is co-owned by five siblings, onefifth (1/5) by each. Brother B sells a mineral servitude in and to one-half
(1/2) of his interest in the land, or a net one-tenth (1/10) mineral interest
in the land, to X.
Minimally, whose additional consent is needed in order for X to be
able to exercise his rights under the servitude? In other words, what is the
fewest number of other siblings who must give their "consent" in order
to permit X to be able to operate? What form should such "consent"
take?
Article 164 of the Louisiana Mineral Code reads, as follows:
A co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude out of his
undivided interest in the land, and prescription commences from the
date of its creation. One who acquires a mineral servitude from a co-
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owner of land may not exercise his right without the consent of coowners owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the
land, provided that he has made every effort to contact such coowners an1, if contacted, has offered to contract with them on
substantially the same basis that he has contracted with another coowner. A co-owner of the land who does not consent to the exercise
of such rights has no liability for the costs of development and
operations, except out of his share of production.
Note that the threshold of eighty (80%) per cent to be attained is of
"interest in the land;" the article does not speak in terms of "mineral
interest." Therefrore, the fractional quantification of the mineral interest
of X - in this case, ten (10%) per cent - is totally immaterial as it is not
an "interest in the land." Or, as stated in Article 169, "[c]o-ownership

does not exist between the owner of a mineral right and the owner of the
land subject to tae right. . . ."
With the foregoing in mind, and ignoring the quantification of X's
interest, and looking only at the co-owners of the land, the consent of
only three other co-owners - totaling sixty (60%) per cent - is necessary.
Unless the servitude grant denied the right to operate on the land, the
consent of B is inherent in the grant of the servitude to X, regardless of
the numerical irterest of the minerals so conveyed. Thus, the consent of
other co-owners totaling sixty (60%) per cent, coupled with B's interest,
would equal eighty (80%) per cent, and X would be allowed to operate
on the land.
G. Conduci of Operations by Lessee Under Mineral Lease Granted
by Co-owner ofLand.
Article 166, Louisiana Mineral Code, states, as follows:
A co-owner of land may grant a valid mineral lease as to his
undivided interest in the land but the lessee may not exercise his
rights thereunder without consent of co-owners owning at least an
undivided eighty percent interest in the land, provided that he has
made every effort to contact such co-owners and, if contacted, has
offered to contract with them on substantially the same basis that he
has contracted with another co-owner. A co-owner of the land who
does not consent to the exercise of such rights has no liability for the
costs of development and operations or other costs, except out of his
share of production.
The rationale behind Article 166 is that, since no single co-owner
may appropriate the land to his own use to the exclusion of other coowners,271 such a co-owner cannot grant to a third person greater rights
271

Juneau v. Laborde, 228 La. 410, 82 So.2d 693 (1955); Moreirav. Schwan, 113 La.

643, 37 So. 542 (1904); McVay v. McVay, 318 So.2d 660 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1975);
Spencer v. Spencer, 273 So.2d 605 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973); Coon v. Miller, 175 So.2d
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than he himself has.272 A mineral lease granted by a co-owner is not
invalid for lack of the consent of all other co-owners, but the lessee under
such a lease cannot operate on the surface of the co-owned land without
obtaining the "consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty
percent interest in the land."
In an instance when the consent of another co-owner is required in
order to operate on the land, the first co-owner may still grant a mineral
lease. Here it is necessary to distinguish between the granting of a
mineral lease - which a co-owner may lawfully do without the consent of
anyone else - and the exercise of rights or the conduct of operations
under such a lease - which cannot be done without the requisite level of
consent. The existence of a co-ownership situation does not prevent a
single co-owner from granting a mineral lease and, if the co-owner does
so, it is a perfectly valid lease.' However, the lessee may not operate
under that lease without the requisite consent. So, what is precluded in
the absence of the requisite consent is the right to conduct operations
under the lease, not the granting of the lease itself.
H. Conduct of Operationsby Co-owner of Mineral Servitude.
Article 175, Louisiana Mineral Code, states, as follows:
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct operations on
the property subject to the servitude without the consent of coowners owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the
servitude, provided that he has made every effort to contact such coowners and, if contacted, has offered to contract with them on
substantially the same basis that he has contracted with another coowner.

..

. A co-owner of the servitude who does not consent to

such operations has no liability for the costs of development and
operations except out of his share of production.
The analysis and comments set forth above relative to the workings
of Article 166 of the Louisiana Mineral Code are pertinent here.
However, the requirement that the person desiring to operate must secure
the "consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent
interest in the servitude," has reference to obtaining such level of consent
from the owners "of' the servitude, regardless of the quantification of the
co-owned mineral servitude.
385 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1965), writ den'd 176 So.2d 145 (1965).
272
Frost-JohnsonLumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207, 245 (1922)
(". . . no one can convey to another any greater right than he himself has."); Herlitz
Construction Company, Inc. v. Matherne, 476 So.2d 1037 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1985) ("An
assignee acquires no greater rights than its assignor.").
273
What is the worth of such a lease? The lessee - while not able to operate without
the requisite consent - would nevertheless benefit if the leased premises were included
within a compulsory unit, and the undivided interest covered by the lease would result in
the right to participate in unit production.
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I. Conduct of Operations by Co-owner ofLand.
There is no article in the Louisiana Mineral Code addressing the
level of consent needed in order for a co-owner of land - where neither a
mineral servitude nor mineral lease is involved - to drill a well on the coowned land. Because there is no "mineral right" involved - the minerals
are inherent in the ownership under Article 6 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code274 - the matter is not really regulated by such Code, but, rather, by
the provisions of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code relative to coownership.275
As demonstrated by Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Carroll,276
since a co-owner may not change the destination of the co-owned land
without the consent of all co-owners, a co-owner may not conduct
operations on the land if any other co-owner opposes such. Since a coowner cannot do so, neither can its lessee.277
J. Respons-ibilityfor Costs Allocable to Interest of Non-consenting
Owner.
Consistent with the general rule applicable to a party who does not
consent to the conduct of operations, each of the articles cited herein
provides that a "co-owner . .. who does not consent to such operations

has no liability for the costs of development and operations except out of
his share of production."
K. Right of Operator to Operate Pursuant to Order of
Commissioner.
In closing on this issue, mention should be made of the possibility
that a party designated as a unit operator by the Commissioner of
Conservation might, by virtue of that authority alone, have the right to
conduct unit operations on a tract of land, without regard to its status as
being leased or not.
The Conservation Act actually contains a provision which would
support an argument that the unit operator has the right - perhaps the
duty - to drill at a location designated by the Commissioner, and that
statute is La. R.S. 30:9(C), which reads, as follows:
"Ownership of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals
occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form, or of any elements or compounds in
solution, emulsion or associate with such minerals. The landowner has the exclusive
right to explore and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to
reduce them to pos:session and ownership."
275
Article 801, Louisiana Revised Civil Code, instructs that "[t]he use and
management of the thing held in indivision is determined by agreement of all the coowners."
276
Cited at footrote 261, supra.
277
Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Matherne,476 So.2d 1037 (La.App. 3rd Cir.
1985) ("An assignee acquires no greater rights than its assignor.").
274
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Each well permitted to be drilled upon a drilling unit hereafter
established shall be drill*ed at the location designated by the
commissioner of conservation, after public hearing, in the order
creating the unit. The commissioner of conservation shall consider
all available geological and engineering evidence and shall provide
for the unit well to be located at the optimum position in the drilling
unit for the most efficient and economic drainage of such unit with
such exceptions as may' be reasonably necessary where
topographical conditions exist that would make such a location of
the unit well unduly burdensome or where the designated unit well
was drilled or commenced prior to the creation of the drilling unit;
provided, however, the commissioner of conservation shall fix the
well location for each drilling unit so that the producer thereof shall
be allowed to produce no more than his just and equitable share of
the oil and gas in the pool, as this share is set forth in this Section.
Unless a timely judicial review to a Commissioner's Order is
brought in accordance with law,2" the order would be unassailable, and
any attack would constitute an impermissible "collateral attack" on an
order of the Commissioner.279
In Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Company,2"o plaintiff landowner
who declined to lease his land for purposes of oil exploration sued
defendants for trespassing on his property based on the intrusion of a
well bore at a point two miles beneath the surface of his property. The
property in question was included in a drilling unit created by the
Commissioner of Conservation.
Damages sought for this subsurface trespass (an invasion by any
person into the subsurface of another's land) were in the amount of the
value of the oil produced from plaintiff's property. However, plaintiff
had participated in a unit created by the Commissioner of Conservation
and had already received his proportionate share of production from the
unit.
Based on Civil Code Article 490 and Mineral Code Article 6, the
Louisiana Supreme Court determined that plaintiff-landowner owned his
subsurface, but with limitations. He did not own the liquid or gaseous
minerals in the subsurface, and the exclusive right to explore for these
minerals was still subject to statutory restrictions.
Because the Commissioner of Conservation's power to establish
drilling units is a constitutional exercise of the State's police power, the
court found that established codal principles of private ownership need
La. R.S. 30:12.
See O'Meara v. Union Oil Co. of California,212 La. 745, 33 So.2d 506 (1947);
Trahan v. The SuperiorOil Company, 700 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1983).
280
488 So.2d 955 (La. 1986).
278
279
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not necessarily be applied in the context of a unit created by the
Louisiana Office of Conservation. The court, in fact, found unitization to
be a necessary and legal infringement on the usual rights of ownership.
Consequently, the court held that Title 30 and 31 supersede, at least
in part, the general concepts of ownership in Civil Code Article 490
relating to subsurface ownership. This meant that plaintiff was a
participant in an authorized unit created by the Commissioner of
Conservation and his individual subsurface ownership rights could not
interfere with the common interests of other unit participants. Thus, there
was no actionable trespass in this instance.
But, relevant to the issue under consideration, the court added a very
important limiting observation, when it stated that, "[i]n this case, we do
not have a well located on the surface of a tract without the owner's
consent." Notwithstanding this language, your author has heard the
proposition exprcssed that Nunez embodies some sort of license to a unit
operator, without regard to the status of the underlying leasehold.
In a comparion case,"' the plaintiff sued the operator for damages
because the operator located on plaintiffs land a "mud pit, ring levee,
water pit, water well, machinery, pipe, board road, derrick and other
equipment necessary for drilling" the unit well on a tract of land adjacent
to the plaintiffs land.
Noting that the defendant-operator possessed a drilling permit
issued by the Commissioner of Conservation pursuant to La. R.S.
:30:204F,282 and that such permit "allows the permit holder to enter the
property for drilling purposes without the owner's consent," the court
concluded "that Vainoco wis entitled to conduct drilling operations on
plaintiff s land." The court stated that:
Plaintiffs exclusive authority over his land has been superseded in
part by Louisiana's Conservation Law which establishes reasonable
statutory restrictions on plaintiffs rights in his property as required
by La. Const Art. I, §4.
VIII. Conclusion
Your author is confident that, in any oil and.gas practice, on more
than one occasion, a client has asked about its rights or obligations
relative to an unleased mineral owner. "Can I charge the unleased
mineral owner for a share of costs of examining title to unitized lands?"
"Can I withhold monies in anticipation of P&A costs which will be
incurred after production ceases?" "Do I have to provide the owner with
information relative to my plans?"
Nunez v. Wainoco Oil and Gas Company, 606 So.2d 1320 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ
denied608 So.2d 101I (La. 1992).
2m2 See now, La. R.S. 30:28F.
2811
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As yet another illustration of the "black hole" that is the legal
relationship between these parties outside of a contractual relationship,
there are not always clear and precise ainswetis; much less guidelines. In
such cases, your author would suggest that the appropriate question
might be, "What will happen to me if I don't" do this or that?
Most landowners are familiar with the "rules of the game" when a
mineral lease contract exists. If nothing else, the written document is
available to answer questions which might arise within the context of the
lessor-lessee relationship.
However, as illustrated in a variety of contexts, when the lessee
releases the lease - when the lessee "walks away" - it is less clear as to

what are the rights and obligations of the now unleased landowner or
mineral owner.

https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/7
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